Letter dated … November 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (see enclosure).

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Nassir Abdulaziz **Al-Nasser**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia

Enclosure

Letter dated 16 October 2006 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1676 (2006).

(*Signed*) Bruno **Schiemsky**
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia

(*Signed*) Melvin E. **Holt**, Jr.

(*Signed*) Harjit S. **Kelley**

(*Signed*) Joel **Salek**

Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006)

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Abbreviations

APRCT	Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat against Terror
BAM	Bakaraaha Arms Market
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICU	Islamist Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
MFV	Motor fishing vessel
MG	Monitoring Group
MV	Merchant Vessel
NVCG	National Volunteer Coast Guard
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Forces
WFP	World Food Programme

Summary
It is the task of the Monitoring Group to observe and report information regarding arms embargo violations and related matters in the context of unfolding events in Somalia. To that end, the Monitoring Group has highlighted its findings for the current mandate period, noting the major factors and developments in the present summary and describing them more fully in the body of the report.

Since the Monitoring Group's last report, dated, 4 May 2006, Somalia has been undergoing a period of great change and transition. The opposition alliance, with its former base in Mogadishu consisting of warlords, dissident TFG Ministers, certain businessmen and others, no longer exists. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) has become the pre-eminent force in the central and southern Regions. With a clearly visible momentum, bolstered by aggressive support from seven (7) states, they are actively strengthening and consolidating their grip on military and political power, and the economic infrastructure in the geographical areas under their control. A much weaker TFG, also backed by aggressive support from three (3) states, is attempting to hold on to its tenuously held power base in Baidoa. Anticipation of a possible military confrontation between the TFG and the ICU is an ever-present threat.

Accompanying and underlying these developments, are rampant arms flows to the TFG and the ICU – the two (2) principal contenders for power in central and southern Somalia. Behind the scenes, large cargo aircraft and ocean-going dhows have been clandestinely delivering arms and other forms of military support from states, arms trading networks and others, almost on a daily basis. Accordingly, both the TFG and the ICU are engaged in an aggressive, rapid and large - by Somali standards – and planned military build-up. It involves obtaining a wide variety of arms – including surface to air missiles - military materiel, motor vehicles – trucks and land cruisers used as mobile weapons platforms – the recruitment of new fighters and volunteers from foreign countries, and establishing military camps and conducting formal military training. In short, all of the essentials necessary for creating and building armies are present. Both sides, but most especially the ICU, are also busy acquiring the all-important financial capacity necessary to maintain this greatly enhanced military machinery.

Further adding to the military build-up in arms and materiel, both sides are actively supported <u>inside</u> of Somalia by the presence of combat troops, military trainers and advisors from certain states. In this sense, the ICU and the TFG are supported by Eritrea, and Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively, all members of IGAD. Also aligned with either the ICU or the TFG are other formidable organized groups of combatants <u>inside</u> of Somalia, adding another layer of complexity and instability to an already unpredictable security environment.

As a result of this overburdened and overstressed military environment, tensions between the TFG and the ICU are exceedingly high, and volatile, and are accompanied by all of the ingredients for the increasing possibility of the occurrence of a violent, widespread, and protracted military conflict in most of Somalia. Adding to this momentum toward a <u>military solution</u> is the publicly stated intention by the ICU to violently oppose any IGAD or African

Union (AU) military force foisted on this volatile military mix – an environment highly vulnerable to a plausible catalyst for a grand fight. Moreover, there is the distinct possibility that this momentum toward a military solution inside of Somalia may spill over into a direct state-to-state conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as occurrences in other vulnerable Regional states of acts of terrorism.

In an effort to seek responses from the multitude of actors involved in arms embargo violations, a total of 54 letters have been sent by the MG to a combination of states, businesses, and entities. It has received 26 replies, as of the writing of this report, mid-October 2006. Some of the respondents avoided answering questions by providing information that was not relevant to the questions asked, and others gave conflicting responses to questions concerning the same information. In the final analysis, all respondents denied any involvement in violating the arms embargo. The foregoing effort aside, the unbridled military build-up in Somalia continues.

In view of the unprecedented and highly exacerbated security situation in Somalia, the MG proposes new inter-related recommendations that, if implemented, are intended to reduce the level of tension and offset the continuous momentum toward a military catastrophe in Somalia. The new recommendations call for the following actions: (1) increasing the strength of the arms embargo through an all-border surveillance and interdiction effort that is intended to severely curtail or cut-off the flow of arms, military materiel and other forms of military support to Somalia, (2) the application of financial sanctions on significant Somali owned and operated businesses intended to reduce monies and other financial resources available for purchasing arms and military materiel, and (3) a high level, international diplomatic effort intended to disengage states from contributing to the military build-up in Somalia, while at the same time trying to move political dialogue between all relevant Somali actors toward a political solution for Somalia.

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1676 (2006) of 10 May 2006, the Security Council conferred the following mandate on the Monitoring Group on Somalia:

(a) To continue the tasks outlined in paragraphs 3 (a) to (c) of resolution 1587 (2005);

(b) To continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international agencies, all activities, including in the financial, maritime and other sectors, which generate revenues used to commit arms embargo violations;

(c) To continue to investigate any means of transport, routes, seaports, airports and other facilities used in connection with arms embargo violations;

(d) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of those individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and when the Committee deems appropriate;

(e) To continue making recommendations based on its investigations, on the previous reports of the Panel of Experts (S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1425 (2002) of 22 July 2002 and 1474 (2003) of 8 April 2003 and on the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (S/2004/604 and S/2005/153, S/2005/625 and S/2006/229) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1519 (2003) of 16 December 2003, 1558 (2004) of 17 August 2004, 1587 (2005) of 15 March 2005 and 1630 (2005) of 14 October 2005;

(f) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo;

(g) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo;

(h) To provide to the Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing within 90 days from its establishment;

(i) To submit, for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, a final report covering all the tasks set out above, no later than 15 days prior to the termination of the Monitoring Group's mandate.

The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium), arms expert and Chairman; Melvin E. Holt, Jr. (United States of America), arms expert; Harjit Kelley (Kenya), maritime expert; and Joel Salek (Colombia), finance expert.

The Monitoring Group travelled to Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Yemen.

Throughout the period of its mandate, the Monitoring Group kept the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) informed of its activities by submitting bi-weekly progress reports through the United Nations Secretariat and by providing a midterm briefing to the Committee on 6 September 2006.

The Monitoring Group received much-appreciated support and assistance from the United Nations Secretariat and other United Nations agencies, in New York and the Region.

B.Methodology

The Monitoring Group interviewed government officials in the region, including members of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and, where relevant, representatives of diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. The Monitoring Group also contacted numerous key, knowledgeable individuals from Somali civil society and the business community.

The two reports of the Panel of Experts (see S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) and the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (see S/2004/604, S/2005/153, S/2005/625 and S/2006/229) were also taken into consideration during the investigations. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the Monitoring Group's first and second reports also apply to the present mandate.

II. Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period

Rampant arms flows

Information gathered during the current reporting period indicates that arms flows into Somalia, most especially to the two (2) principal antagonists - the TFG and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – has dramatically increased in terms of numbers of arms, frequency of delivery and weapons' sophistication. Arms flows have been aggressively fed by a growing number of individual states, and to a lesser degree, arms trading networks. This has been taking place in the greater context of a broad-based military build up by both sides.

The majority of arms provided to the ICU by states - seven (7) - and arms traders include the types that are typically used in Somalia. But, ominously, new and more sophisticated types of weapons are also coming into Somalia including man portable surface to air missiles such as the Strela-2 and 2M, also known as the SA-7a and 7b 'Grail', and the SA-6 'Gainful' Low to Medium Altitude surface to air missile. Other new types of arms include multiple rocket launchers, and second generation, infrared-guided anti-tank weapons.

On the other hand, arms provided to the TFG by states - three (3) - and arms traders overwhelmingly include the types that are historically typical for the Somali environment including assault rifles, a

variety of machine guns and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, and large quantities of ammunition.

A. Support from states and arms traders

As was the case during the previous mandate, ending in May 2006, the Monitoring Group notes the continuation of an expanding number of states – ten (10) at the writing of this report - providing different types of support to either the TFG or the ICU in violation of the arms embargo. State contributions to the TFG and ICU are either clandestinely delivered directly to the intended recipient using State owned means of transport, or, indirectly using an intermediary in the form of a private commercial maritime vessel - usually dhow - or aircraft in an effort to disguise the contributor's true identity. Contributions include large quantities of a wide variety of arms including assault rifles and small caliber machine guns, large caliber anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and mines, among others. They also include military materiel, motor vehicles – trucks and land cruisers used as mobile weapons platforms - military troops, trainers and advisors, and funding. The MG has identified the following arms embargo violations:

Djibouti

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Djibouti has provided military uniforms and medicines in support of the ICU, as follows:

(a) On 30 July 2006, an aircraft from Djibouti Airlines landed at an airfield in Mogadishu, Somalia, with medicines and military uniforms intended for the ICU. The true nature of the cargo was disguised and was represented to be from the Djibouti Red Crescent Society in order to further conceal its origins. After unloading the cargo, the same aircraft departed the airfield and proceeded to Mogadishu's main airport.

The Monitoring Group sent letters on 18 August 2006 to the Government of Djibouti, Djibouti Airlines and the Red Crescent Society of Djibouti notifying them of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring received a reply from the Government of Djibouti, dated 21 September 2006, Djibouti Airlines (Annex I), dated 20 August 2006, and from Djibouti Red Crescent (Annex II), dated 8 September 2006. All respondents denied having violated the arms embargo, as described above.

Egypt

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Egypt has provided training in support of the ICU, Somalia, as follows:

(a) On 26 July 2006, a meeting took place in Mogadishu between officials from the ICU and visiting Libyan, Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the residence of ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: military training would be provided to about 3800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks located near Bal'ad town, north of Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi "Eyrow", Abdullahi Ali Nuur and

Mukhtar Roboow "Abu Mansuur" were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

On 23 August 2006, the ICU opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed their first contingent of about 600 recruits who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training.

On 19 September 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Egypt notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. On 2 October 2006, the Monitoring Group received a reply from the Government of Egypt (Annex III) denying their involvement in the above described activity.

Eritrea

During the current mandate period, the Government of Eritrea provided at least 28 separate consignments of arms, ammunition and military equipment. They also provided troops and training to the ICU in Somalia, as follows:

Eritrean support to the ICU

(a) On 26 April 2006, a shipment of arms consisting of AK 47 assault rifles, PKM machine guns, RPG 7s and a variety of ammunition arrived on a dhow at the seaport of El Ma'an. The arms were from the Government of Eritrea and were destined for the ICU.

(b) On 6 May 2006, at about 0500 hours, an Eritrean military aircraft – Antonov – landed at Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud Region, Somalia. Awaiting the landing of the aircraft were about 75 people, five lorries and two land cruisers. The vehicles headlamps had been turned on to facilitate the landing of the aircraft. The aircraft transported a shipment of anti-aircraft guns. The arms were offloaded from the aircraft and loaded onto the lorries. The lorries, accompanied by the land cruisers, travelled by road to a natural seaport near Hobyo on the Somali coast.

On 9 May 2006, a dhow arrived at El Ahmed seaport located south of Marka, Lower Shabelle Region. On board the dhow were fighters from Pakistan and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The fighters remained on the dhow. Five (5) out of the 75 people associated with the 6 May receipt of the anti-aircraft guns boarded the dhow along with part of the shipment of the anti-aircraft guns. The dhow then departed the port of El Ahmed travelling south along the coast with a destination Raskiambooni located in south Somalia. The Monitoring Group has previously reported that the Raskiambooni area serves as a training and support center for militant fundamentalists. In charge of the Raskiambooni center is Sheikh Hassan Abdulle Hersi "Sheikh Hassan Turki", a known militant and leader of the Munathamul Jihad wa Dawa (Organisation for Jihad & Propagation).

(c) On 15 June 2006 and continuing over a short period of time, about one (1) week, four (4) Eritrean military aircraft landed at Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud Region. Included onboard the

aircrafts were various types of arms including AK 47 assault rifles, PKM (machine guns), RPG launchers, a variety of ammunition and military uniforms.

ICU member Aden Hashi Farah "Eyrow", one of the leaders of the Hizbul Shabaab (Youth Movement), took possession of the arms and military uniforms. The shipment was loaded onto lorries and transported under the protection of 12 technicals to Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, the shipment was separated into four (4) consignments and variously distributed to militant forces in Mogadishu, Marka, Barawe and Kongo (former TFG military training camp near Jowhar), where the Eritreans intend to set up a military base in support of the ICU.

(d) On 19 June 2006, a dhow arrived at El Ade seaport (Mogadishu area) containing 24 LAWs (M72-series lightweight anti-armour weapon), 1200 anti-tank mines, 4000 F1 hand grenades, an unspecified number of small arm ammunition boxes, 2000 uniforms, 1500 military style, individual water bottles, and medicines. The arms and other items were transported from the Port of Assab, Eritrea.

(e) On 30 June 2006 a vessel using the name SELAM travelled from the Eritrean seaport of Massawa to Somalia carrying food and arms, as follows: 2000 tones of food, around 50 DShK, 50 82mm mortars, 3000 AK-47 and 1000 boxes of ammunitions.

(f) On 4 July 2006, four (4) flights of Eritrean military aircraft landed at Esaley Airport located in the northeastern area of Mogadishu; two (2) of the flights contained arms for the ICU and two (2) of the flights transported a total of approximately 500 military personnel consisting of Eritrean military and fighters from the Ethiopian insurgent groups ONLF and OLF.

Subsequent to their arrival at Esaley, all of the military personnel were transported to El Ma'an seaport. At El Ma'an, militant fundamentalist businessman and financier Abukar Omar Adani made arrangements for the troops to be transported by dhow to the vicinity of Marka, Lower Shabelle. The three-fold purpose of the troop deployment to the Lower Shabelle is to create an alternative headquarters in addition to Mogadishu and establish both a new military base and a training camp for foreigners – both military trainers and fighters. The location of the new facility is located near both the seaport and airport of El Ahmed.

(g) On 15 July 2006, Colonel Yusuf Negash Warque, an Eritrean military officer, arrived in Mogadishu on a chartered aircraft. The Colonel, who speaks Somali, conducted a meeting with leaders of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts including from both the Executive Committee and the Majlis Al Shura (Consultative Committee). The following day, 16 July, Colonel Warque departed Mogadishu in a Toyota pick-up truck and, escorted by four (4) technicals, travelled to Mareer-Gur for a meeting with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.

(h) On 17 July 2006, a vessel using the name MV YOHANA travelled from Eritrea to Somalia carrying food and arms, as follows: 3000 tons of food, 50 DShK, 30 82mm mortars, 2000 AK-47 and 100 RPG-7. It should be additionally noted that in a report by UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2003/223, paragraphs 71-73, a vessel using the name MV YOHANA was also identified as being

associated with the Government of Eritrea's involvement in Somalia arms embargo violations, which, among other things, included delivering arms and transporting troops of the OLF.

(i) On 20 July 2006, an Airbus A-310-300, operated by Daallo Airlines, departed from Assab, Eritrea, destined for Somalia. Onboard the aircraft were a variety of arms, as follows: B-10 anti-tank guns; heavy (large calibre) machine guns; PKM machine guns, with magazines and telescopic sighting devices; AK47 assault rifles; G3A3 assault rifles; Browning .30 calibre machine guns; 120mm mortars; rifle fired grenades. And, on or about 21 July 2006, a second arms shipment, consisting primarily of a variety of ammunition, arrived in Somalia onboard an Airbus A310-300 - also operated by Daallo Airlines.

The Daallo Airlines flights picked up the arms shipments in the Eritrean seaport city of Assab, where the shipments had originally been delivered by dhow. Monitoring Group sources clearly indicate that Eritrea is being used both as a conduit and platform for, and coordinator of, support for the Somali ICU. States using Eritrea for this purpose include Djibouti, Libya, Egypt and certain middle-east countries.

The Monitoring Group sent letters on 18 August 2006 to Daallo Airlines and the Government of Eritrea notifying them of the above information and seeking their responses. All parties replied, as follows: on 22 August 2006, Daallo Airlines (Annex IV) denied participation in the above described events; and on 22 August 2006, the Government of Eritrea (Annex V) denied participation in the above described events.

(j) On 23 July 2006, late in the afternoon, a commercial aircraft arrived at Dhusamareeb (Galgaduud Region) with a shipment of arms for the ICU. The arms shipment consisted of the following: shoulder fired surface to air missiles and second generation, infrared-guided anti-tank weapons – 50 units; RPG's - 100 units; AK 47 assault rifles – 540 units; FAL assault rifles – 94 units; PKM machine guns – 106 units; ZU-23 and DShK anti-aircraft ammunition – unknown number of units; and foodstuffs, water supplies and medicines. The aircraft that delivered the arms had reportedly departed from the UAE empty, and flew to Eritrea where it picked up the arms shipment.

The arms were loaded onto five (5) trucks and, under escort by seven (7) technicals, were transported to Mareer-Gur (Galgaduud Region) which was then the local headquarters of the militants. At a later date, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys relocated the headquarters to Bula'ley, an area approximately 40 kilometres southeast of Dhusamareeb.

(k) On 24 July 2006, an aircraft containing an arms shipment and senior Eritrean military officers arrived in Mogadishu's Esaley Airport. The arms consisted of unknown numbers of rockets and other anti-tank weapons.

(l) On 26 July 2006, a meeting took place between officials from the ICU and visiting Libyan, Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the house of ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: provide military training would be provided to about 3800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks located near Bal'ad town, north of

Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi "Eyrow", Abdullahi Ali Nuur and Mukhtar Roboow "Abu Mansuur" were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

On 23 August 2006, the Islamic military forces opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed their first contingent of about 600 recruits who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys indicated in comments concerning the new recruits that they would be trained, among other purposes, to participate in the defence of Somalia from both internal and external - foreign – aggression.

(m) On 26 July 2006, a dhow originating from Saudi Arabia carrying food items stopped in Eritrea and picked up a shipment of arms. The dhow then continued to Somalia. Onboard the dhow was a retired senior military officer of the Egyptian army who is also a member of the al-ikhwān al-muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood), using the name Ahmed Abu-Masri. The Egyptian posed as the dhow pilot. Also onboard the dhow was a Somali businessman, using the name Omar Isaaq, who had coordinated acquisition of the food items and arms. The dhow arrived in Somalia at Raage Eele, approximately 40 kilometres north of El-Ma'an. The consignments of food and arms were loaded onto waiting trucks and covered to conceal their true identity. The convoy containing the consignments and the Egyptian travelled to Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys' stronghold in the Galgaduud region.

The dhow had a load capacity of 88 metric tons with the markings XL8.5x10 on its hull. The arms shipment consisted of the following: 3600 anti-tank mines and 500 hand grenades. On 18 August 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Saudi Arabia notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

(n) On 26 August 2006, three (3) dhows transporting 2000 fully equipped combat troops from Ertirea arrived at Warsheikh, located north of Mogadishu, along the coast. On arrival at Warsheikh, the troops were re-located to an area in north Mogadishu for ultimate re-deployment to different ICU held areas. They were re-deployed as follows: 500 of the Eritrean troops went to Baledogle, 500 to Hilweyne training camp, 500 to Lower Shabelle, and 500 remained in Mogadishu and were stationed at Villa Baidoa and the former Police Academy, Bolisiya.

(o) At the end of August 2006, at about 0645 hours, a large military transport aircraft arrived in Mogadishu International Airport with a shipment of arms from Eritrea. The shipment consisted of the following: M-46 130mm towed field gun, D-30 122 towed howitzer, M-30 122mm towed howitzer, D-30 152mm , ZU 57-2-57mm , Zu-23-2, Shilka-4-23mm, Zu-23-4, different calibers of mortars, SA-6 'Gainful' Low to Medium Altitude surface to air missile, surface to air missiles PZRK Strela 2M aka SA-7 'Grail', RPG-7.

Eritrean support to the ONLF via the ICU
(p) On 8 July 2006, a shipment of arms transported by camels and donkeys, and under the escort of 70 members of the ICU along with 160 ONLF fighters, entered Ethiopia through the Abudwaq District, Galgaduud Region, Somalia. The shipment consisted of the following: explosives – 06 boxes, shoulder fired, anti tank weapons – 06 units, PKM machine guns – 22 units, AK47 assault rifles – 120 Units, FAL assault rifles – 40 Units and hand grenades – 06 boxes.

Training of ICU militia in Eritrea
(q) On 27 July 2006, upwards of 500 fighters from the military forces of the ICU were flown from Easley Airport, Mogadishu, to Eritrea**.** They were sent for training on the use of the new types of rockets and surface to air missiles shipped by Eritrea to the ICU. Of the approximate 500 fighters, 200 were also to receive training in Eritrea in guerrilla warfare**.** The others were sent to Libya (100) and Syria (200) [more details included under Libya and Syria, this report].

(r) On 8 August 2006, 300 fighters of the ICU were also flown from Baledogle Airport (north west of Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle Region, to Eritrea for the purpose of attending military training on the use of rockets and surface to air missiles that Eritrea had recently delivered to the ICU. Earlier the same day, the same aircraft that transported the fighters also offloaded shipments of AK47 assault rifles and PKM machine gun ammunition at Baledogle Airport.

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 18 September 2006 to the Government of Eritrea notifying it of all of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

The case of ERIKO Enterprise, Asmara, Eritrea
(s) On 26 July 2006, at 07.45 AM, an Ilyushin aircraft (IL-76) containing an arms shipment for the ICU arrived at Mogadishu International airport**.** Also on board the aircraft were 10 senior Eritrean military officers. The Eritrean officers were lodged in the Ramadaan Hotel, owned by Abukar Omar Adani, who is a financier of the ICU.

The IL-76 departed from Assab, Eritrea, indicating a flight plan designating a destination of Hargeisa (Somaliland), but the aircraft went to Mogadishu. The IL-76 used the call sign or LFT-1221. The IL-76 has the Kazakhstan flag painted on the tail. The registration number on the fuselage of the aircraft starts with the following pre-fix: **UN** - which is the code for Kazakhstan.

Before landing, all road routes in the proximity of the airport were closed and vehicle traffic was redirected elsewhere. Security of the area and offloading of the arms shipment were coordinated by the leader of the Hizbul Shabaab, Sheikh Mukhtar Roboow "Abu-Mansuur". The arms were offloaded onto seven (7) trucks that were covered to conceal the identity of the cargo. Another truck, carrying barrels of fuel, was left uncovered. The arms shipments consisted of a wide variety of weapons, spare parts, and ammunition including, among others, the following: assault rifles, hand grenades, mines, PKM machine guns, LAWs, surface to air

missiles, multiple rocket launchers, different calibres anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns. Also on board the aircraft were military uniforms, machine gun belts (feeder belts) and medicines.

(t) On 28 July 2006, two (2) IL-76 cargo aircraft landed - the first aircraft at 0700 hours - at Mogadishu International airport. Both aircraft contained arms shipments for the ICU. Again, before the aircraft landed, all road routes in the proximity of the airport were closed to vehicle traffic. The arms shipments consisted of the following: anti-tank weapons; ZP-39 anti-aircraft guns with seats; 80 extra barrels for the ZP-39; boxes of ammunition for ZP-39; DShK heavy machine guns and boxes of ammunition; PKM and boxes of ammunition; AK 47 and boxes of ammunition; grenade launchers for the AK 47; mines; FAL assault rifles and boxes of ammunition; grenade launchers for the FAL assault rifle; SAR-80 assault rifles; anti-personnel mines; B-10 anti-tank guns and boxes of ammunition; and 60mm mortars and boxes of ammunition.

The arms were offloaded onto lorries and, escorted by a security detail consisting of 25 technicals, transported and distributed to three (3) arms storage facilities in Mogadishu - Villa Baidoa, Villa Somalia and the former Police Academy Bolisiya (between the international airport and the main seaport). The majority of the arms were divided between Villa Somalia and the former Police Academy.

Subsequently, arms from the three (3) shipments of 26 and 28 July were further distributed to militias belonging to the ICU in Mogadishu, Jowhar, Buur Hakaba (located along the road between Mogadishu and Baidoa) and Guriel (Dhusamareeb area).

(u) On 7 August 2006, an Ilyushin 76 (IL-76) aircraft operated by ERIKO Enterprises, using flight call sign LFT-3756, departed Assab, Eritrea, with a destination of Mogadishu International Airport, Somalia.

The Monitoring Group sent letters to the Government of Eritrea on 9 August 2006 and 1 September 2006, and the Government of Kazakhstan on 15 August 2006, requesting their responses concerning four (4) IL-76 flights reported to have variously taken place on 26 and 28 July, and 7 August 2006. The Monitoring Group also sent letters on 19 September 2006 to Aerolift Company, based in South Africa, and to the Government of South Africa requesting their responses to the above information. As of the submission of this report, the Monitoring Group had not received a reply from the Government of South Africa.

The Government of Eritrea did not reply to the 9 August 2006 letter. They replied to the 1 September 2006 letter in a letter dated 6 September 2006 (Annex VI) informing the Monitoring Group, as follows: "The Government of Eritrea does not have any information on the arrival or departure of the said aircraft. The Government of Eritrea is gravely concerned about the continued spread of misinformation on Eritrea's alleged violations of Security Council resolution 733 (1992)" In the same letter, the Government of Eritrea also stated the Monitoring Group's information "…is totally wrong and lacks credibility."

However, subsequently, the Monitoring Group received the following information: (1) ICAO and the Air Traffic Control Authority from a neighbouring country confirmed the flights, (2) on 19 September 2006, the Government of Kazakhstan (Annex VII) provided ownership information for the IL-76 in question that indicated the aircraft belonged to Aerolift, and (3) on 29 September 2006, Aerolift (Annex VIII) provided information that indicated that the same IL-76 had been sold to ERIKO ENTERPRISE, an Eritrean company, before the flights to Mogadishu took place. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group made several attempts to establish contact with ERIKO, during the first two (2) weeks of October 2006. Eriko could not be reached for comment.

Seeking additional information and clarification, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group placed a follow up telephone call on 3 October 2006 to the same Aerolift representative who had provided the above indicated assistance and asked for additional information. The representative told the Chairman that he would provide documentation that would show that the aircraft in question was operated by ERIKO. However, as of the submission of this report, the Monitoring Group had not received the promised documentation.

The case of the B-707 of Euro Oceanic Air Transport Ltd

The Monitoring Group received information that on 8 and 10 October 2006, a B-707 aircraft - the same aircraft used on both days - flew from Massawa, Eritrea to Mogadishu International Airport. The B-707 aircraft bore a Ugandan registration number 5X-EOT and used the call sign MHU of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd, formerly Air Memphis. Cargo transported on the 8 October flight consisted of generators, medicines, 2500 single person tents and 30 larger tents, 400 pieces of telecommunication equipment for vehicles, 1500 communications handsets and 10 sealed containers. The intended recipients of the cargo were the ICU military forces based in Raskiambooni, Guriel, Mogadishu and Kismaayo. Cargo transported on the 10 October flight included an unknown quantity of arms and representatives of an ICU military force who were being returned to Somalia from a state that has been providing support to the ICU following completion of military training.

Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd is based in Kampala, Uganda. The Chairman of the Monitoring Group placed a telephone call to the Chairman of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd, who furnished the following information: the B-707 (referenced in the foregoing paragraph) was smuggled out of Egypt on 5 July 2006 and was at the time of its flights from Massawa, Ertirea to Mogadishu, Somalia on 8 and 10 October operated by Euro Oceanic Air Transport, a company based in Bahrain. This company used the registration number, Air Operator Certificate and call sign without authorization from Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd. The Chairman of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd further informed the MG that they sent letters to the authorities of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Yemen and the UAE after they learned that the aircraft was transporting arms shipments from Eritrea to Somalia (Annex IX).

Ethiopia
The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Ethiopia has provided arms, training and/or contingents of military units to the TFG, warlords, Somali clans and the Puntland administration in Somalia, as follows:

Ethiopian support to the TFG
(a) On 28 June 2006, at 0400 hours, four (4) trucks containing 10 metric tons of ammunition left Dollow, Ethiopia, en route to Baidoa. The trucks are reported to belong to a businessman and had been specifically contracted to deliver the cargo to TFG President Yusuf in Baidoa.

(b) On 29 June 2006, Khalif Isse Mudan, owner/operator of Mudan Airlines signed a contract with TFG, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi in a hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, granting Mudan Airlines the right to transport weapons and ammunition from Ethiopia to Baidoa for the TFG.

(c) On 3 and 4 July 2006, a total of two (2) flights of Mudan Airlines aircraft transported Ethiopian troops and arms to Baidoa. The aircraft transported both the troops and arms from the Ethiopian military installation located in eastern Ethiopia at Goday (aka: Gode). The senior Ethiopian military officer (General) in charge of the operation on behalf of his Government and who accompanied the flights to Baidoa is named GABRE. TFG President Yusuf requested the troops and arms as a response to learning that Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys had been appointed head of the Majlis Al Shura (Consultative Committee) of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts.

Upon arrival at Baidoa, the Ethiopian troops went immediately to President Yusuf's compound. The troops are part of a four-fold plan to support the TFG. The soldiers charged with the responsibility of providing security to President's Yusuf residence are from Zone 5 in Ethiopia and have Somali physical features. Their other responsibilities include personal protection of President Yusuf, assisting in the overall defense of Baidoa, offensive manoeuvres against any militant assault and support of Yusuf's militia.

(d) On or about 20 July 2006, late in the night, Ethiopian military forces, in a convoy estimated to consist of 93 vehicles, crossed the border from Dollow, Ethiopia, into the Gedo Region of Somalia. The troops were deployed to several locations within Gedo, Bakool and Bay Regions, as well as in the vicinity of Baidoa. Also, among the vehicles in the convoy were 40 armoured vehicles, or technicals, some of which were mounted with multiple rocket launchers. The armoured vehicles/technicals supported by TFG units, deployed to a location about 25kms east of Buur-Heybe (Buur-Eyle).

Sources reported that the Ethiopian units exchanged gunfire with two reconnaissance technicals belonging to Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde in Bullafulay, located northwest of Baledogle, resulting in three (3) militiamen killed and the two technicals with the crew members captured. Ethiopian reconnaissance units were spotted in Kabahirig ex-Commando training camp approximately 10 kms northeast of Baledogle, as well as the perimeters of Jowhar and Baledogle on 23 July 2006.

The ICU also deployed some of their units during the same time frame in the areas of Baledogle and Leego. The Monitoring Group learned that over 200 technicals had been assigned to positions entailing all routes leading to Mogadishu.

(e) On 25 September 2006, several hundred of Ethiopian combat troops arrived in Baidoa from Ethiopia.

(f) The Ethiopian military has set up several training sites in the greater Baidoa area including, as follows: 1) Labatan Jirow, former prison site about 60 kilometres north of Baidoa, is jointly operated by the Ethiopians and the TFG as a training camp and also serves as a weapons storage location; 2) Daynuunay, former military base about 28 kilometres southeast of Baidoa, is a training camp, where the Ethiopians have about 30 technicals, 10 of which are mounted with ZU 23-4 or ZP 39 anti-aircraft guns; 3) Manas, former military base 30 kilometres south of Baidoa and the largest camp with Ethiopian presence.

Ethiopian recruitment of new militia

(g) During July and August 2006, in the Gedo Region, Somalia, Ethiopian military personnel including a security and intelligence officer named Colonel Atto Abraha Getchew were actively involved in recruiting new militia members for the TFG. The Colonel is based in Geedweyne, Dolow District, Gedo Regioin, Somalia. The Ethiopians provided incentives to the elders in the forms of vehicles and money to promote the recruitment process. Once recruited, new recruits were sent to military training facilities in the vicinity of Dolow, Ethiopia/Somalia border town.

(h) During mid-July 2006, about 400 new Somali recruits were undergoing military training at the Dolow facility. At the training facility, the new recruits received the necessary individual combat equipment and uniforms. Following their training, the recruits using 4x4 vehicles and under the command of the Ethiopian military, were tasked to conduct patrolling activities in the Gedo Region.

Ethiopian support to Puntland

(i) On 8 August 2006, a delegation from Puntland led by Puntland's Minister of Interior – Mohamed Ahmed Warsame "Seefta Banaanka" – travelled to Werder town, Zone 5, Ethiopia, for meetings with an Ethiopian military, General officer. The delegation that included the commander of Puntland Darawiish forces briefed the Ethiopian General on the threats anticipated from the Islamic military forces in their advance toward Puntland. The General responded by ordering arms shipments to be given to the Puntland forces. It consisted of 800 AK47 assault rifles, 120 PKM machine guns, 24 boxes of ammunitions and an unknown number of boxes of landmines and hand grenades.

In Zone 5, Ethiopia, the arms were transferred from two (2) Ethiopian military trucks to two (2) trucks belonging to the Puntland delegation. The trucks traveled through Zone 5 to the border with Somalia where they were joined by 80 armed escorts for the overland journey to Galkayo, Mudug Region (central Somalia).

A team of three (3) senior Ethiopian Military officers, under the leadership of a colonel, accompanied the Puntland delegation back to Somalia. The team's mission was to conduct fact-finding relative to the threat posed to Puntland by the Islamic military forces.

(j) On 7 August 2006, a commercial aircraft containing an arms shipment from Ethiopia arrived in Garowe (capital of Puntland). The shipment consisted, among other arms, primarily of LAW's and ammunition. The transport cost for the aircraft was shared by the Ethiopian government and President Yusuf (TFG).

(k) On 10 August 2006, an aircraft from Ethiopia containing a shipment of arms arrived in Galkayo. The shipment consisted of LAW's and ammunition for the AK-47, PKM and RPG's.

(m) On 3 September 2006, Puntland President Mohamud Muse Hersi (Adde-Muse) confirmed that troops of the Ethiopian Armed Forces – numbering 300 - are staying in Galkayo, and further stated that they would be training Puntland militia forces.

President Muse, Ethiopian officials and Qeybdiid had earlier held a meeting in Garowe, Puntland, to discuss the specifics of mutual defence assistance for the purpose of halting the advance of the ICU on Galkayo and Puntland. Ethiopia agreed to provide weapons and ammunition, uniforms, medicines, food, transport, military training, troops, command and control, and planning assistance.

Following the meeting of 3 September 2006, Ethiopia provided the following support: training for a total of 1500 personnel representing a combination of militias from Puntland and Qeybdiid; 3000 fully equipped Ethiopian combat troops; eight (8) troop transport trucks; twelve (12) 4x4 pickup trucks; five (5) land cruisers; four (4) tanker trucks; and arms: AK 47 assault rifles – 400 units and 15 boxes of ammunition, RPG 2 and 7s – 60 units and 140 pieces of ammunition, PKM machine guns – 90 units and 20 boxes of ammunition, land mines – 340 units, anti-personnel mines – 180 units.

Further, on 2 October 2006, President Muse told the Chairman of the MG during a telephone conversation that Ethiopian military personnel were present in Puntland. He specifically mentioned that 32 military (advisors) were, at the time of the conversation, located in Galkayo (Mudug Region), and providing training to President Muse's militias. He added that the Ethiopian training, which he acknowledged would end in two (2) weeks, was being provided to his militias to strengthen their capacity to halt the infiltration of Ethiopian rebels from Somalia into Ethiopia.

[Note: The MG has learned that Somaliland authorities expressed serious concern over Ethiopian military support to Puntland, fearing that Puntland my use it against them in their longstanding border dispute.]

Ethiopian support to Somali clans

(n) On 17 July 2006, Ethiopian military units under the command of Captain Hassey Aliow crossed the border with Somalia in the Beletweyne District, Hiraan Region. The Ethiopians conducted meetings with Somali Elders and militia chiefs of the Baadi'ade and Ujejeen clans

for the purpose of intelligence gathering regarding the activities of the ICU in the Hiraan Region.

The Ethiopian military also distributed an arms shipment to the clans that consisted of landmines (anti-tank) – 100 units and AK 47 assault rifles – 400 units. Adan Jimaale Garas, aka: Adan Geri, of the Ujejeen clan accepted the weapons on behalf of both clans.

(o) On 24 August 2006, Ethiopian units arrived in Jawiil of the Hiraan region and met community elders and security officials from Ujejeen and Galje'el clan of the Hawiye. They discussed security cooperation and in particular monitoring of the activities of the ICU gave them the following weapons: AK 47 assault rifles – 200 units.

(p) On 29 August 2006, 607 (AK47 rifles – 400 units, PKM – 200 units and RPG – 07 units) assorted units of weapons and communication equipments from Ethiopia were delivered in Galkayo by road and distributed as follows: Darood/Harti/Dhulbahante subclan – 427 units; Hawiye/Habargedir/Sa'ad subclan – 100 units; Darood/Leelkase – 80 units. The allocation to the Dhulbahante was driven on truck to Lasanood on 30 August 2006.

(q) On 30 August 2006, Ethiopian military units with Mr. Donyaale of Reer-Dalal subclan of the Marehan arrived in the border town of Balanbale in the Galgaduud region. They met few selected individuals and later on handed over the following weapons to the Marehan in order to establish security forces and cooperate with them: PKM – 05 units; RPG – 05 units; AK47 assault rifles – 230 units; hand grenades (F1) – 1000 units.

Ethiopian support to Somali warlords – former members of the opposition alliance

(q) On 24 May 2006, the Ethiopian military sent a large consignment of ammunition, including small arms ammunition, to former Jowhar warlord Mohamed Dheere, via the then Governor of Hiraan Region, Yusuf Dabageed. The shipment was transported on five (5) trucks and once received by Mohamed Dheere, was, in part, distributed to some former members of the opposition alliance/counter terrorism alliance in Mogadishu.

(r) On 24 May 2006, part of a consignment of ammunition sent to Mohamed Dheere by the Ethiopians and forwarded through Yusuf Dabageed had been bought with funding by the ICU through former warlord Musse Suudi's men in Bal'ad: Maalim Farah and Gudbaaye. Both of these men were paid for their services to the ICU, $20,000 and $40,000, respectively.

The shipment of ammunition had been transported on five (5) trucks and distributed to former members of the opposition alliance/counter terrorism alliance including Mohamed Dheere. Maalim Farah and Gudbaaye persuaded Dheere's militia commander to sell them 12 metric tons of light weapons ammunitions. Dheere's militia commander later disappeared and switched sides.

(s) Beginning from approximately July 2006 and continuing to mid-October 2006 (time of completion of the writing of this report), the Ethiopian Government provided certain former Somali

warlords, members of the Mogadishu based opposition alliance, with the following military assistance:

Mohamed Dheere, former Governor of Middle Shabelle, with its capital in Jowhar, received a quantity of AK 47 assault rifles and ammunition and eight (8) 4x4 vehicles to be used for technicals;

Mohamed Qanyare, warlord and former TFG Minister, received AK 47 assault rifles – 90 units and 20 boxes of ammunition, PKM machine guns – 30 units and 35 boxes of ammunition, RPG 2 – total of 140 units of ammunition for RPG 2 and RPG 7, and rifle fired grenades – 80 units, and land mines – 200 units;

Abdi Qeybdiid, former warlord and police boss of Mogadishu, held talks with Ethiopian military in Goday (Zone 5), Ethiopia, and following the talks received arms, uniforms, trucks and Ethiopian troops to accompany him back to the Galkayo area, Mudug Region, central Somalia. The specific items consisted of AK 47 assault rifles, pistols, PKM machine guns, RPG 2 and 7, a variety of ammunition, hand grenades, military tents and radio communication equipment. These items were transported in two (2) trucks, while five (5) trucks were used to transport Ethiopian troops.

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 15 September 2006 to the Government of Ethiopia and a letter, dated 18 September 2006, to Mudan Airlines notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The MG received a reply from the Government of Ethiopia (Annex X), dated 9 October 2006. The Government of Ethiopia indicated, effectively, that the allegations contained in the MG's letter were "without basis" and that the letter contained "manifestly erroneous information". However, on the other hand, the Government of Ethiopia acknowledged in their letter that "the CCIC (Consultative Council of Islamic Courts) has continued to import all types of sophisticated arms from outside the region, and also has been receiving fighters from areas proximate to our region in great numbers." It is interesting to note that this latter information is fundamentally consistent with information contained in this current report of the MG.

The Monitoring Group had not received a reply from Mudan Airlines by the time of the submission of the present report.

Iran

The Monitoring Group received information that the Government of Iran has provided at least three (3) separate consignments of arms and ammunition, and medical supplies and the services of three (3) medical doctors to the ICU, as follows:

(a) The Monitoring Group received information that on 25 July 2006, an aircraft containing a shipment of arms from Iran arrived at Baledogle airport and was met by the Courts Union head of Security Affairs, Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siyaad "Indohaadde" and the Chairman of the Dayniile Islamic Court, Sheikh Hussein Janaqow. The arms shipment consisted of the following: PKM machine guns and M-79 grenade launchers – 1000 units; shoulder fired surface to air missiles – 45 units; an unknown quantity of mines; 200 boxes of ammunition for the PKM; military uniforms,

water-cans; first aid boxes – 2500 units; and packed food – 600 boxes. Also on board were 3 Iranian doctors to provide first aid training and other emergency medical support services to the ICU. On 9 August 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Iran notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. In its reply, dated 26 September 2006, the Government of Iran informed the Monitoring Group that "according to the information received from the relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there has been no transfer or shipment of any kind of weapons or military equipments from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia". The Government of Iran further informed the Monitoring Group that "no flight has taken place from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia on July 25, 2006 and that therefore, the allegations raised against my country in the aforementioned letter are totally rejected" (Annex XI).

(b) At the time of the writing of this report, there were two (2) Iranians in Dhusamareeb engaged on matters linked to the exploration of Uranium in exchange for arms to the ICU.

(c) Further to the arrangements made by Hizbollah on behalf of the ICU in exchange for the participation of the military force of ICU in Lebanon, on 14 August 2006, an aircraft from Iran arrived at Baledogle Airport containing a small shipment of arms. It also transported about 40 wounded members of the ICU military force that had fought on the side of Hizbollah. (See Hizbollah Section this report).

(d) In the early morning hours of 17 August 2006, a large dhow containing food commodities and arms destined for the ICU arrived in El-Adde seaport, Mogadishu. Before arriving in Mogadishu, the dhow travelled from the coast of Iran to the UAE where the food commodities were taken onboard.

The arms portion of the shipment came from Iran and consisted of 80 man-portable, shoulder fired surface to air missiles and rocket launchers. In addition, there were 120 sealed boxes with unknown contents, but the wording on the surface of the boxes indicated that the contents contained medical goods.

The dhow's captain and his assistant were reported to be from Singapore and Bangladesh, respectively. Also reported to be on board the vessel were two (2) engineers that were simply identified as Asian, and two (2) Somali businessmen from the UAE, who were responsible for coordinating the consignments of arms and foodstuffs.

On 18 September 2006, the Monitoring Group also sent a general letter to the Government of Iran notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply to this letter by the time of the submission of the present report.

Hizbollah (Lebanon)

The Monitoring Group received information that the Hizbollah movement (operating in Lebanon) has provided military training and has made arrangements with other states on behalf of the ICU for the ICU to receive arms, as follows:

During mid-July 2006, the ICU sent approximately a 720 person strong military force to Lebanon to fight along side of Hizbollah against the Israeli military. The Somali force was personally selected by the ICU, Hizbul Shabaab (Youth Movement), Aden Hashi Farah "Eyrow". As part of the criteria of the selection process, individuals were chosen based on combat experience that might include Afghanistan.

Only about 80 members of the force initially returned to Mogadishu after the fighting. Some of the returning fighters were wounded and were sent to a private hospital in Abdul-Aziz, an area in northern Mogadishu. The hospital is operated and secured by the ICU. Some of the funds used to buy medicines for the wounded originated from a businessman using the name of Abdi Karim. Karim. The funds for the ICU, totalling about $390,000, had been donated from a number of supporting countries.

A number of the fighters also remained in Lebanon for advanced military training by Hizbollah. And, further, between 8 and 10 September 2006, about 25 Somalis returned to Somalia accompanied by five (5) members of Hizbollah.

During the recruitment and selection process for the Somali force the following financial incentives and arrangements were offered to the fighters and their families: 1) $2000 (USD) given for the families of individual fighters to use while the fighters were in Lebanon; 2) in the event that a fighter was killed, between $25,000 and $30,000 (USD) would be given to the fighters family; 3) upon return to Somalia from fighting in Lebanon, a fighter would receive hero money of $100 (USD) per month (for and unspecified amount duration of time).

In exchange for the contribution of the Somali military force, Hizbollah arranged for additional support to be given to the ICU from the Governments of Iran and Syria, which was subsequently provided (see Iran and Syria Sections this report).

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 27 September 2006 to the Government of Lebanon notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

Libya

The Government of Libya has sent military aircraft to Somalia and has provided training, funds and at least one (1) separate consignment of arms in support of the ICU, as follows:

(a) The Monitoring Group received information that an IL-76 using call sign LAAF (Lybian Arab Air Force) 930 and operated by the Libyan government, landed on 20 April 2004 in Mogadishu, Somalia. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group also received information that on 6 September 2005 another IL-76 operated by the Libyan government landed at Baledogle airport (northwest of Mogadishu), Somalia.

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 12 June 2006 to the Government of Libya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. On 8 August 2006 the Government of Libya informed the Monitoring Group (Annex XII), as follows: "The two Libyan aircrafts are air-

force planes usually used for air cargo. They made two trips to Somalia one on 20 April 2004, and the other on 14 September 2004. The purpose of both trips was to repatriate illegal aliens who have infiltrated into the country".

The Monitoring Group wishes to note that it did not receive from the Government of Libya the requested documentation with regard to the flights such as air cargo manifests, airway bill, flight plans and names of the crew.

(b) On 24 July 2006, a delegation of Libyan military officers arrived at Baledogle Airport, located west of Mogadishu and on 26 July 2006, participated in a meeting in Mogadishu with officials from the (ICU) and visiting Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the house of ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: provide military training to about 3800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks located near Bal'ad town, north of Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi "Eyrow", Abdullahi Ali Nuur and Mukhtar Roboow "Abu Mansuur" were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

Subsequent to the meeting, Libya provided $1,000,000 (one million USD) to be used to organize the future training and for salaries – ranging between $75 and $450 (USD), depending on rank.

On 23 August 2006, the ICU opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed their first contingent of about 600 recruits who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training.

(c) On 31 July 2006, a vessel from Lybia with arms and food for the ICU docked in the early morning hours at the seaport of El-Ma'an (Mogadishu area). The vessels' cargo was given to the following officials from the Security Committee of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts: Abdulahi Moalin Gaab "Abu-Uteyba", Aden Hashi Farah "Eyrow", Sheikh Mukhtar Roboow "Abu-Mansuur" and Sheikh Hassan Mukhtar (Raskiambooni group). The inventory of the shipment is as follows: 12 DShK heavy machine guns; 24 RPG; 70 PKM; 350 grenade launchers for AK-47 assault rifles; an unknown quantity of ammunitions for AK-47, PKM and RPG2/7; 2000 spare tires of different types for the technicals; 80 generators; vegetable oil, sugar, wheat flour and dates.

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 9 August 2006 to the Government of Libya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

(d) On 27 July 2006, 100 fighters/militia from the ICU where transported by aircraft to Libya to undergo advanced military training in small unit tactics and use of special weapons.

The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 19 September 2006, to the Government of Libya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

Saudi Arabia

The Monitoring Group received information that the Government of Saudi Arabia provided logistical support in the form of foodstuffs and medicines that were specifically intended for use by the military forces of the ICU in Somalia, as follows:

(a) On 11 June 2006, a C-130 aircraft, using flight call sign SVA6708, departed Jazan, Saudi Arabia, with a destination of Baledogle Airport (northwest of Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle Region, Somalia. Baledogle is an important entry point for arms for the ICU. In order to obtain details concerning the cargo of this particular flight, the MG sent a letter, dated 25 August 2006 (Note: The correct date of the MG's letter is 1 September 2006), to the Government of Saudi Arabia notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. In its reply (Annex XIII), dated 28 September 2006, the Government of Saudi Arabia explained that the flight that took place was for "medical" reasons.

The Monitoring Group wishes to note that it did not receive from the Government of Saudi Arabia the requested documentation with regard to the flights such as air cargo manifests, airway bill, flight plans and names of the crew.

(b) On 20 July 2006**,** a maritime vessel, originating from Saudi Arabia and containing cargo consisting of foodstuffs and medicines for the ICU, arrived at the seaport of El Ma'an, Somalia, located north of Mogadishu. The cargo was reported to have been provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia.

Following a dispute over payment of port landing fees between Abukar Omar Adani and Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, the vessel relocated to Mogadishu seaport, where it was unloaded and the cargo delivered to the ICU.

On 14 August 2006, seven (7) trucks containing logistical supplies, including food and ammunition, left Mogadishu for ICU located in the central regions of Somalia. Accompanying the convoy of trucks were also 320 fighters from the ICU. They were being sent to add to the numbers of fighters in the central regions. Sheikh Abdullahi Yare was in charge of the convoy and the fighters.

On 18 August 2006 and 1 September 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a total of three (3) letters to the Government of Saudi Arabia requesting details of the above-mentioned information. The Monitoring Group received a letter from the Saudi Mission to the United Nations confirming receipt of the letter, dated 18 August 2006, but had not received a substantive reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

Somalia

TFG

(a) On 11 July 2006, the Monitoring Group received a copy of an email prepared by the TFG, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Somali Republic to the United Nations, New York, referring to new developments in Somalia. Contained in the email are references by the Deputy Permanent Representative to very reliable reports received by the TFG concerning foreign forces, money and weapons having arrived in Mogadishu, as well as reports relating to the preparation of an attack by Islamic Courts. The Monitoring Group immediately responded to the email and sent a letter, dated 17 July 2006, to the Government of Somalia requesting details of the above referenced information. As of the time of the submission of present report - mid-October 2006 - the Monitoring Group had still not received a reply.

(b) Furthermore, at the request of the Monitoring Group, the Secretariat of the United Nations tried several times to organize a meeting between the Somali Mission to the United Nations and the Monitoring Group, while the Monitoring Group was in New York during early September 2006 to give its mid-term briefing. The Somali Mission did not respond to the repeated requests for meetings.

(c) Finally, the Monitoring Group, within the framework of due process, sent a detailed letter, dated 21 September 2006, to the Government of Somalia notifying it of information obtained by the Monitoring Group regarding their involvement in arms embargo violations. As of the time of the submission of present report - mid-October 2006 - the Monitoring Group had not received a reply.

Somali Islamic Courts Council

(d) The Chairman of the Monitoring Group had several discussions by telephone with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC) and discussed the Council's involvement in arms embargo violations.

(e) Within the framework of due process, the Monitoring Group also sent a letter, dated 20 September 2006, to the SICC, addressed to Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, reinforcing the substantive aspects of the earlier telephone conversations with the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and seeking a written reply. The Monitoring Group received a letter, dated 2 October 2006, from the SICC and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Annex XIV). In their letter, the SICC dismissed the Monitoring Group's allegations as "baseless" and "categorically" denied violations of the arms embargo. However, on the other hand, they charged, "Ethiopia is the main country that has been breaking the UN arms embargo on Somalia on a regular basis…….Ethiopia has been openly supplying enormous quantities of sophisticated arms to the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa….."

Syria

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Syria has provided arms, ammunition and training in support of the ICU, as follows:

(a) On 27 July 2006, 200 fighters from the ICU where transported by aircraft to Syria to undergo military training in guerrilla warfare.

(b) Further to the arrangements made by Hizbollah on behalf of the ICU and in exchange for the ICU's military force's participation in Lebanon (see under "Hizbollah" section),

approximately between 27 August and 3 September 2006, an aircraft travelling from Syria via Eritrea arrived at Esaley Airport, Mogadishu, carrying a shipment of arms for the ICU. The shipment consisted of a large quantity of handguns, AK 47 assault rifles, RPG 2 and 7s, PKM machine guns, three (3) surface to air missiles and a variety of ammunition.

The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 22 September 2006, to the Governments of Syria notifying them of the above information and seeking its response. In their reply (Annex XV) to the Monitoring Group, dated 9 October 2006, the Government of Syria effectively denied its involvement in the above described matter.

Uganda

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Uganda has provided arms, ammunition and military personnel in support of the ICU, as follows:

On the morning of 26 August 2006, TFG President Yusuf, Prime Minister Gedi, the Chief of Staff, General Naaji, and others conducted a closed-door meeting to conclude preparations for the arrival of the Ugandans at Baidoa. Following the meeting, three (3) aircraft transporting a contingent of Ugandan military (UPDF) personnel and other officials of the Ugandan Government landed in Baidoa (Bay Region), Somalia. The military personnel were armed and brought with them a variety of other military materiel including a quantity of ammunition, tents, communications equipment, a forklift and fencing material**.** They also brought with them the barrels of 80 anti aircraft guns. The remaining parts of the weapons were to be airlifted from Uganda to Ethiopia and then transported by trucks to Baidoa.

The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 31 August 2006, to the Government of Uganda notifying them of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

Yemen

The Monitoring Group received information that approximately during the time period 9 June through 6 September 2006, 20 arms shipments were sent from the territory of Yemen to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, as follows: 14 shipments from the Government of Yemen – 13 to the TFG and 1 (one) to the Puntland Administration; and 6 (six) shipments from the trading networks – 5 (five) to the ICU and 1 (one) to the Puntland Administration. The details of the arms shipments are as follows:

Government of Yemen support to the TFG

(a) Between 9 June and 24 July 2006, Mudan Airlines transported a total of 12 arms shipments from Bossaso (Puntland) to TFG President Yusuf in Baidoa. The arms shipments originated in Yemen and were flown to Bossaso by Government of Yemen military aircraft.

The 12 shipments were delivered to Baidoa, as follows: 9 and 16 June – one (1) shipment each day; and 10,11,12,14 and 24 June – two (2) shipments each day. The shipments variously consisted of large quantities of ammunition for the AK 47 assault rifle, RPG, PKM machine gun, M-79 grenade launchers, portable jeep gun; and large numbers of weapons including ZPU heavy machine guns, ZP-

39 and ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns, M-40 recoilless rifles (anti-tank), M-79 grenade launchers, SG-43 heavy machine guns, RPG-2 and RPG-7, AK47 assault rifles, PKM machine guns and pistols.

(b) On 27 July 2006, four (4) dhows containing arms and military uniforms destined for TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed arrived in Bossaso, Puntland, Somalia. Transportation costs for the shipments were shared by President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Government of Yemen. President Yusuf thereafter sent an envoy to receive the goods on his behalf due to the deteriorating political and security situation in Baidoa. The shipment consisted of the following: PKM machine guns – 250 units per dhow for a total of 1000 units; RPG ammunition – 200 units per dhow for a total of 800 units; and military uniforms – 3500 units, total.

Government of Yemen support to the Puntland Administration

(c) On 4 August 2006, four (4) dhows containing arms for the Puntland authorities arrived in the Seaport of Bossaso, Puntland, Somalia. Transportation costs for the shipments were shared by TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Government of Yemen. The arms consisted of the following: PKM machine guns, AK47 assault rifles, RPGs and a variety of ammunition.

(d) On 2 October 2006, President Muse told the Chairman of the MG during a telephone conversation that Puntland had not received military support (during the current mandate) from Yemen.

Yemeni Arms Trading Networks

Yemeni arms trading networks continue to be active and have been sending large shipments of arms on a regular basis to Somalia. Early in the mandate, when the ICU were fighting against the opposition alliance, also commonly known as the counterterrorism alliance, in Mogadishu, the trading networks were shipping arms to both sides in the conflict. In the case of the counterterrorism alliance, the traders sent the arms to the BAM from where the alliance made large and regular purchases. In the case of the ICU, the traders shipped the arms directly to them. Following defeat of the counterterrorism alliance, the networks began to ship arms almost exclusively and directly to the ICU, avoiding the BAM. Subsequently, the arms traders also sent arms to the Puntland Administration. The following are examples of direct arms shipments to the ICU and the Puntland Administration:

Shipments to the ICU

(e) On 10 and 13 June 2006, two shipments of arms, each transported by dhow, arrived in the seaports of El Ma'an and Harardheere, respectively. The 10 June shipment was received by Somali financier and businessman Abukar Omar Adani at El Ma'an; the 13 June shipment was received by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys at Haradheere. Both shipments originated with the Yemeni arms trading networks. The combined arms shipments consisted of AK47 assault rifles – 314 units, PKM machine guns – 35 units, DShK anti-aircraft guns – seven (7) units, ZU 23 anti-aircraft guns – five (5) units, and ammunition for the foregoing weapons. Fuel and medicines were also included in the shipments. The arms and other items were for the ICU in Mogadishu and for distribution to other ICU strongholds in central and southern Somalia.

(f) On 12 July 2006, a dhow from Yemen, using the name of Al-Soufa XL2x60 and containing an arms shipment, arrived in the Seaport of El-Ma'an, Somalia. The arms shipment consisted of the following: LAW's (M72-series lightweight anti-armour weapon) – 24 units; AK 47 assault rifles – 2500 units; RPGs – 40 units; and RPG ammunition – 1500 rounds. The consignment was received by representatives of both Abukar Omar Adani and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. The arms were to be provided to ICU military elements operating in the Kismaayo and Baidoa areas.

(g) On 2 August 2006, a dhow, belonging to a businessman from Bassaso (Puntland) and containing an arms shipment and fuel – 100 barrels - from Yemen, arrived in El-Adde temporary seaport in Mogadishu. The arms consignment consisted of the following: ZU-23-1 with a seat for the gunner – 18 units; DShK – 60 units; AK47 assault rifles – 500 units, and 24 boxes of ammunition. The cargo was given to ICU Finance Chief, Mohamud Omar Adani for forwarding to ICU military elements operating in the Hiraan and Galgaduud Regions.

(h) On 12 August 2006, a dhow from Yemen, using the registration XXLB and containing arms and logistical supplies and destined for the ICU, was seized by pirates near Harardheere, central coast of Somalia. In response to seizure, the ICU conducted a military attack on the pirates in Haradheere and retrieved the dhow and its contents. The dhow contained the following cargo: RPGs – 25 units; DShK – 10 units; PKM machine guns – 90 units; AK47 assault rifles – 400 units; fuel – 42 drums and a variety of ammunition.

Shipment to the Puntland Administration

(i) On 6 September 2006, an arms shipment arrived at Bossaso. The Puntland Administration bought weapons from local merchants in Yemen that were subsequently transported via dhow to the seaport at Bossaso. The shipment consisted of following: AK47 assault rifles – 600 units; DShK – 14 units; shoulder fired anti-tank weapons – 12 units; PKM machine guns – 60 units; RPD machine guns – 20 units; RPGs – 20 units; and fuel – 45 barrels.

The Monitoring Group sent three (3) letters, as follows: on 1 September 2006 to the Government of Yemen, on 18 September 2006 to Mudan Airlines, and on 18 September 2006 to the Government of the U.A.E. (where Mudan Airlines is based) notifying them of the above information and requesting a response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply from Mudan Airlines and the Government of the UAE by the time of the submission of the present report.

However, the MG did receive a substantive reply from the Government of Yemen (Annex XVI), dated 30 September 2006. Regarding Government of Yemen complicity in arms embargo violations, they denied providing "…weapons or military assistance to the Somali Government, to Puntland state or to any of the Somali parties during the period referred to..." in the Monitoring Group's letter. They also indicated their readiness to send a list of aircraft flights specifically requested by the Monitoring Group, but did not send it. In the latter sense, they also noted "..that most of the flights from our country to Bossasso are transit flights." Regarding arms smuggling networks operating out of the territory of Yemen and delivering arms to Somalia by dhow, the Government of Yemen affirmed that it is combating the admitted

problem in a number of different ways including having recently referred the owners and men of several "boats" to the courts.

B. The Bakaraaha Arms Market

Historically, the Bakaaraha Arms *super*-Market has been a crucial and conspicuous element in the pattern of arms flows in central and southern Somalia. Past reports of the MG have detailed large quantities of many different types of arms routinely passing through the BAM, an activity that, among other things, contributed to the general condition of insecurity and instability in Somalia. The BAM was also a thriving commercial enterprise, with significant amounts of currency, especially USD, exchanging hands from buyer to arms dealer. And, regardless of the purchaser – member of the *opposition alliance* or warlord, member of the TFG, businessman, or ICU – funds for arms purchases from the BAM came from revenues generated in local administrations, the commercial activities of businessmen, and from contributions, or gifts, both from states and private sources.

Previous patterns of overall activity at the BAM, as described above, have changed, however, with the final defeat of the opposition alliance - Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat Against Terror (APRCT) - during the first week of June 2006 by the ICU. Subsequently, the ICU gained control over all of Mogadishu including the BAM.

The ICU has been engaged in talks with principal arms dealers of the BAM in an attempt to determine how best to regulate the activities of the market. While the future role of the BAM is uncertain, however, it remains in operation, but with the total volume of arms transiting the market having dropped measurably. Correspondingly, prices for weapons and ammunition have also fallen.

In a large part, the initial decline in activity at the BAM can be attributed to the fact that arms dealers at the market were apprehensive about the possible reaction of the ICU to previous sales to the APRCT (counterterrorism alliance). Another reason for change has been the direct delivery of arms by traders to the intended recipient without first going via the BAM.

However, during the last half of the current mandate, arms sales at the BAM are on the rise. The buyers making the most significant purchases at the time of the writing of this report are some former Mogadishu based warlords and Sharia Courts. Different Sharia Courts continue to buy arms at the market. The Courts that are purchasing the arms are reportedly in a <u>friendly</u> competition with one another to see which Court can accrue the most lethal and otherwise impressive inventory of arms.

The Somali warlords, members of the former Mogadishu based opposition alliance, are buying increasing numbers of arms and are working through relatives to arrange for clandestine purchases of large calibre weapons from arms traders of the BAM. The large calibre weapons are for mounting on technicals belonging to the warlords. These types of weapons are not normally supplied by Ethiopia to their Somali allies and, therefore, must be obtained elsewhere.

Typically, the warlords' relatives negotiate with the arms dealers for prices and delivery of the weapons. Once purchased, the weapons are dismantled into separate pieces and hidden in trucks that

transport food or clothing. The arms are then subsequently delivered to the warlords or their agents. The arms transactions are kept secret to avoid discovery by the ICU.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the arms experts of the Monitoring Group have gathered details concerning some deliveries of arms to the BAM and subsequent purchases (Annex XVII).[1]

C. The case of Air Tomisko

The Monitoring Group received information that on 2 August 2006 an Ilyushin aircraft (IL-76) - registration number YU-AMJ, using call sign TOH607 - operated by Air Tomisko, landed at Mogadishu International Airport, Somalia. The aircraft departed from Salalah, Oman. Mogadishu International Airport is under the control of the ICU who is in the process of being re-supplied with arms and military materiel following their hostile takeover of Mogadishu and its environs.

The Monitoring Group sent a total of three (3) letters, dated 18 August 2006, to the airline company Air Tomisko and to the Government of Serbia, where Air Tomisko is based, and the Government of Oman, notifying them of the above information and seeking their responses.

The Monitoring Group received a reply from Air Tomisko, dated 30 August 2006, and the Government of Serbia, dated 15 September 2006. Documentation provided by Air Tomisko, including a Cargo Manifest (Annex XVIII), dated 1 August 2006, indicates that the aircraft was transporting "Bulk Cargo" primarily consisting garments and shoes. The Government of Serbia in its reply simply re-affirmed the Air Tomisko reply.

However, in contradiction to the above mentioned replies, the Government of Oman in its reply (Annex XIX), dated 25 September 2006, informed the Monitoring Group that the aircraft in question had "repatriated Somalis apprehended while illegally entering Oman." The Monitoring Group continues its investigations.

D. The case of Global Aviation and Services Group

The Monitoring Group received information that on or about 27 September 2006 an Ilyushin aircraft (IL-76) - registration number 5A-DQA, using call sign GAK-114/115 - operated by Global Aviation, based in Tripoli, Libya, landed at Baidoa, Somalia. The aircraft had departed from Kufra, Libya. Transported on the aircraft were two (2) bullet-proof vehicles for President Yusuf and senior officers of the Ugandan military.

The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 5 October 2006, to the Managing Director of Global Aviation notifying him of the above information and seeking his response. The Monitoring Group received a reply from Global Aviation, dated 12 October 2006, which included a copy of two different Air Waybills. However, the reply did include other important documentation and information requested by the Monitoring Group. As a result, the investigation continues.

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1. Due to document-processing deadlines, the transactions indicated in annex I are current only up to 20 September 2006. However, the Monitoring Group will continue to update information concerning BAM transactions and present additional information, if available, to the Committee.

III. Finances

A. Introduction

As the ICU expands politically, militarily and geographically, they are giving great attention to organizing and managing their economic and financial resources. Serious effort is being directed to traditional and other sources of revenues including: 1) local administrations (checkpoints, seaports, airports); 2) financial support from the business community - a strategic financial alliance between ICU and most of the Somali business community in an effort to boost key main sectors of the Somali economy, obtaining therefore more revenues; and 3) increasing contributions from inside Somalia and foreign countries.

By contrast, the TFG does not seem to have an applicable financial plan, has little available funds, and lacks a system to obtain revenues. It depends, for the most part, on financial support foreign countries.

The purpose of this section is to approach the above-referenced topics in more detail, since they comprise sources of revenues that both sides depend upon to finance their activities in violation of the arms embargo.

B. Local Administrations: changes in the revenue-generating infrastructure.

In southern and central Somalia, possession of key revenue generators has changed hands from the former warlords to the ICU. After gaining overall control of Mogadishu in June 2006, the ICU started to re-organize and create a self-sufficient revenue system to make their administration viable. At the moment, the most evident elements of this process include a partial removal of checkpoints in Mogadishu and the refurbishing of infrastructure of long-time unused key public assets, such as the Mogadishu seaport and airport, and they have instituted a program of taxation.

Revenues from checkpoints and small businesses

For example, the ICU removed three (3) checkpoints in the Mogadishu area where average monthly revenues collected represented cash flows to the former warlords in excess of one million US dollars annually. The checkpoints were at the Bakahaara, Madina and Sinai districts of the city. Numerous other checkpoints were also dismantled which represented revenues collected on behalf of warlords that exceeded several millions of US dollars annually. At this point in time, there has not been an immediate replacement for those revenues and efforts are on going towards finding alternate funds that in the past allowed regular maintenance of militias.

However, an apparent immediate consequence of this action was a reduction in some cases of up to 50% of the delivery costs for goods and commodities, which ultimately will benefit the business community and by extension the ICU.

In other cities now under control of the ICU the settlement and establishment of a revenue structure has faced difficulties. For instance in the city of Jowhar (previously analyzed in the MG report S/2005/625 of 4 October 2005) the ICU met resistance from small businesses when confronted

required to pay additional fees different from the ones they were already paying to the ousted administration. There, unlike what happened with checkpoints in Mogadishu, the ICU decided to keep checkpoints at the city-limits, or outskirts, of Jowhar. In summary, revenues from small businesses account for $ 655,000 US dollars a year, while at entry points to the city of Jowhar revenues collected are in the order of $1.3 million US Dollars a year. (Annex XX)

In the local administration of Lower Shabelle, traditionally under control of Sheik Yusuf Mohamed "Indohaadde", who on 30 September 2006 handed over control of the region to the ICU, checkpoints are also still in position. Such is the case at the place called "Laanta Buuro" where revenues were collected on average $ 3.9 million USD annually. In this local administration, checkpoints continue to be a source of immediate revenues for the maintenance of the ICU.

Thus, in every local administration now under the control of the ICU, conditions relating to the removal or maintenance of checkpoints are different. They have to discuss the topic with clan leaders and/or members of their own organization. It is clear that the ICU is in the process of implementing a plan to secure sustainable sources of revenues in each local administration, but taking into consideration the differences in the political and economic dynamics of every one of them.

Mogadishu seaport and airport

The ICU is rapidly taking control over the most important airports and seaports in southern and central Somalia including along the central coastal portion of the country (Hobyo, Harardheere), airstrips located in the greater Mogadishu area (K-50 and Dayniile)[2] and most recently, on 24 September 2006, over the key seaport and airport of the city of Kismaayo[3]. Mogadishu airport and seaport represent both actual and symbolic power of the Somali economy.

The ICU authorities consider Mogadishu seaport and airport as public assets and therefore have agreed to form an organization to take care of them, operating sort of a national seaport and airport authority. In the case of the Mogadishu seaport, they have initially trusted its operation to the consortium of the business cartels running El Ma'an seaport. (The consortium was object of analysis in the previous report of the MG - S/2006/229 of 4 May 2006). Since the opening of the Mogadishu seaport in August 2006, the neighboring seaport of El Ma'an, was closed.

The ICU has appointed experienced businessmen as managers of the Mogadishu seaport and airport. An example of this approach by the ICU is reflected in the strategic finance alliance between the ICU and Abdulkadir Abukar Omar, Head of Finance, ICU, who is also a successful private businessman and partner in one of the Mogadishu based cartels. (Annex XXI)

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[2] Those facilities generate revenues of $1.4 and $ 1.5 millions US dollars a year, respectively, as mentioned in the MG report S/2006/229 of 4 May 2006.

[3] Kismaayo seaport and airport: revenues collected were analyzed in detail in previous MG report S/2005/625 dated 4 October 2005, but as referenced, it is worth noting that as an average the seaport produced revenues of about 1.4 million USD per month, while the airport generated 58,000 USD per month, during the same period.

Seaport

The re-opening of the Mogadishu seaport was essential for the ICU/businessmen strategic finance alliance for the purpose of increasing the volume of import and export operations, while lowering operational costs, therefore generating more revenues. The Mogadishu seaport offers more opportunity for revenue generation than El Ma'an due to its ability to stay operational year round and its port infrastructure.

With regard to taxes that are collected, the MG has obtained information indicating that effective 29 July 2006 the ICU and Mogadishu based business cartels have agreed to certain taxation rates for the seaport that include fees on commodities, labour, and transportation. Taxes on goods and commodities are mostly levied on weight (kilograms and tons), volume and type of goods (energy generators, vehicles, timber, mattresses and others). (Annex XX)

Although it is still too early to establish yearly income amounts, Mogadishu seaport has the potential to produce significantly more revenues than did El Ma'an. To give an indication of the future potential revenues that may be generated at Mogadishu seaport, the following graphic shows that during the years 2003 and 2004, El Ma'an seaport earned from 22.5 to 30 millions USD, respectively, easily surpassing the revenues earned at the other main Somalia seaports.

Graphic No.1



Non-Official data

Once fully operational, the Mogadishu seaport may become one of the main revenue generators for the ICU/businessmen strategic financial alliance, as it used to be for the central government that collapsed in the year 1991.

Airport
After been closed for about 11 years, the ICU has reopened the Mogadishu airport, effective 15 July 2006. As general manager, the ICU has appointed a businessman who holds shares in two of the most important Somali airlines and is also member of the Somalia Union of Traders.

Fees are levied on entry and exiting passengers at a rate of $ 20 US dollars each, inbound-outbound cargo (especially seafood), handling, security provision and landing. It has been recently reported that the airport produces monthly revenues at an average of $ 550,500 US dollars and has the potential to generate $ 6.6 millions US dollars annually. (Annex XXII).

C. The ICU and the business community.
The ICU has made a strategic financial alliance with the great majority of large businesses in Somalia, an alliance that benefits both sides, as follows:

The benefits for the ICU:
- it is not a product of improvisation, it is a deliberate and well-planned alliance; and

- the ICU heavily relies on the "know how" of the businessmen, because they want the businesses to effectively create a highly profitable business environment with wide ranging and essential infrastructure in key economic sectors; they also want to promote an environment that supports a strong future relationship between the ICU and the business community.

The benefits for the businessmen:
- generally, restoration of law and order is good for business;

- reduction of operational costs, for example, of up to 50% by the removal of checkpoints;

- increase in overall volume of imports equals more profit; and

- an increased in the area of coverage where humanitarian relief goods are distributed, reflects and increase of private business profits.

Business structures
Considering the importance of the above-mentioned alliance, the MG now has a better understanding of an increasingly important aspect of financial support for the ICU. The MG further investigated the organization of the most prominent Somali business community.

The core of the leading Somali business community is composed of a approximately 20 experienced businessmen with highly profitable businesses. Their businesses are interrelated and have operations that cover virtually the whole country. The concept presented by the MG, referring to the Somali business community as "business cartels" remains more valid than ever. (See S/2006/229, 4 May 2006.)

The MG is now aware of 11 business cartels (versus three (3) that the MG reported in S/2006/229) that entail a total of 60 companies, all related to five economic sectors as shown in the following graphic. Each business cartel has a lead company in one of these sectors and many associated or satellite companies in the others, thus facilitating its entire operations.

Graphic No. 2
Business community and main Somali economic sectors



Some remarks of these economic sectors are:
1-Trade: Includes revenues from imports, exports and the operation of seaports and airports.
2-Remmittances: This sector only has been frequently mentioned in previous reports to have an estimate volume of operations of about 800 million to $1 billion USD a year.
3-Telecommunications*:* As an observation, it is worth mentioning that in Mogadishu there are approximate 25.000 land lines, served by only 3 companies that charge from 0.10 to 0.30 USD per minute.
4-Transport and Fuel: Obtains revenues from maritime, air and ground transportation, logistics, cargo handling, warehousing and supply of necessary fuel to carry out these operations.
5-Construction: Derives revenues from construction work mostly required from international organizations.

As a conclusion, at the moment the ICU seems to have a broad mosaic of economic sectors headed by businessmen ready to provide the necessary financial support.

Effects on trade and remittance economic sectors
The overall expansion of the ICU has also created a mutually beneficial relationship on the trade and remittance sectors - expansion in these sectors generates revenues that benefit ICU military expansion and military expansion benefits the trade and remittance sectors. Examples of this relationship can be seen, as follows:

Increased trade

When comparing imported items through El Ma'an Seaport from January to June 2005 with the same period in 2006, note that there is an increase in the imports of some important goods in Somalia:

Table 1

Item/Year	**1st half 2005**	**1st half 2006**	**% Increment**
Vehicles	487 units	1,025 units	110
Cement	16,067 M/tons	31,685 M/tons	97
Cooking oil	297,634 Litres	491,392 Litres	65
Sugar	60,717 M/tons	80,507 M/tons	32

Non-official data

Since the beginning of the year 2006, and especially since the take over by the ICU, there has been a steady increase in trade. Somali businessmen inside and outside the country are keener to make more business deals, taking advantage of reduced costs and improved security conditions in Mogadishu, that also contribute to minimizing risks and enhancing profits. Given time, more businesses and greater profits will generate more revenues for the ICU.

Remittance sector

During the present mandate, the remittance economic sector has seen an increase in the amount of funds transiting the system. In particular, there have been some remittance businesses that the MG believes have been actively funnelling money used to commit arms embargo violations by both the TFG and the ICU. The following three (3) cases are illustrative:

Case 1

On or about 4 July 2006, a prominent leader, Sheik Ali Warsame – former chairman of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya (AIAI) - of the ICU sent $ 250.000 US dollars to a businessman in Mogadishu through a remittance business. The money was later handed-over to the leadership of the ICU in that city. The origin of the funds was a businessman in Saudi Arabia. Initially, the money was sent to a remittance branch in Somaliland and from there re-sent to its final recipient in Mogadishu, all in an effort to conceal the source of the funds.

Case 2

On or about 10 July 2006, TFG leaders attempted to send cash in the amount of $100,000 US dollars and ammunition to a warlord that at the time was engaged in a fight against ICU's militia for the control of an area in Mogadishu. The money was transported concealed in two trucks carrying vegetables, however it was intercepted by members of the ICU at a roadblock in Afgooye, a town near Mogadishu. The original transfer of the funds was made by another well-known Somali remittance business.

Case 3: Tremors in the remittance sector

During the month of May 2006 one of the leading Somali remittances companies, Dalsan, International, went bankrupt. Dalsan's co-founder and chairman was Mohamed Sheikh Osman,

former spokesman of AIAI. The brother of Adan Hashi Ayro, ICU leader of Al-Shabaab ("The Youth") was also part of the management of Dalsan. No official explanation for the bankruptcy has been put forth, and at the time of the bankruptcy, about $10 million US dollars disappeared from Dalsan's accounts.

Dalsan was among the top five (5) main companies that shared 75% of the market of the Somali remittance economic sector. Its business operations involved more than 100 agents in 30 countries, remitting operations for more than 150 million US dollars a year and an estimated capital of 8 million dollar with licensed branches in the United States, United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates, among other places. Some Dalsan staff members commented that the reason for the bankruptcy was that branches of the company were lending money without recording the transactions, making it almost impossible to recover the moneys lent.

However, according to MG sources, one of the reasons of the bankruptcy was that an ICU military leader managed to divert a large amount of money to help financially support the organization in their fight for the control of Mogadishu during the June 2006 confrontation with the former counter terrorism alliance.

Additional information obtained by the MG during the mandate indicates that another Somali money remittance business may have filled the void left by Dalsan. A number of business representatives of Dalsan have moved their business operations to the new company. Sources have indicated that the ICU also uses this business for their financial transactions.

D. Greater financial support from inside Somalia and abroad.

Since the ICU's expansion, information indicates that increasing amounts of money are flowing to support ICU operations. The funds have their origins from both outside and inside of Somalia. Reports indicate that individual contributions from inside of the country in amounts of as much as $170,000, $250,000 and $600,000 US dollars have been sent from Puntland, Somaliland and Mogadishu, respectively.

Funds from abroad

According to information obtained by the MG, the ICU requested from wealthy Somali Diaspora members to add an extra amount of money in each remittance. The amount may vary from 5% to10% of the total amount being sent. The explanation given was that funds are needed in order to maintain the security and stability in the areas now under their control.

The potential for the ICU to add more funds to their expanding financial capability may be considerable, amounting to several million US dollars a year. For example, during recent months, fundraising by the Somali Diaspora has seen donations via the Hawala system from the UK of an estimated $ 1.1 million US dollars, and the Somali communities in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland of an estimated $ 300,000 US dollars**.**

However, a small number of Somali companies may have been forced to make contributions to the ICU. Information obtained by the MG suggests that, for example, three (3) large money remittance

businesses made donations in the form of military hardware to the ICU. This notwithstanding, they represent only a small fraction of the overall business community – three business out of a total of about 60 large businesses – the remainder of which willingly supports the ICU.

Other examples of significant externally derived funds can be noted in connection with Sheikh Indohaaddhe, who, on or about 15 July 2006 collected about $5 million out of an available $11 million US dollars reportedly originating from Zakat[4] in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The funds were also reported to have been transferred to the ICU in Mogadishu.

In addition, the MG has learned that money - $2 million US dollars - reported to have been sent from Iran to the ICU in Mogadishu during August 2006 along with a consignment of military cargo transported on board an Ilyushyn 76 aircraft.

E. Funds for the TFG.

The investigation of the MG shows that by contrast, the TFG has little funds available from inside the country, relying all most completely on foreign contributions. Most of their internally generated revenues originate from the operations of the Bossasso seaport, Puntland. For comparative purposes, and to give a monetary indicator of the US dollars involved, the seaport generated annual revenues of approximately 9 million and 12 million US dollars in the years 2003 and 2004, respectively. While current dollar figures are not readily available, it is safe to say that several millions of dollars – small in comparison to the funds available to the ICU - are likely available to the TFG to make purchases of arms and other military necessities.

A case of money printing

Since October 2005, the MG has been investigating a case where a large amount of counterfeited Somali Shillings was seized from the son-in-law of TFG President Yusuf by the customs authorities in Dubai, UAE. The intended recipient of the shipment was the TFG. In order to obtain additional information, letters were sent in December 2005 to Dubai Customs in this regard, but no reply has been obtained. Subsequently, in July 2006, the MG learned that after facing trial, the son-in-law, who had been arrested for attempting to the move150 billion Somali shilling (about $10,2 million US dollars) via Dubai, was exonerated of having the intention to circulate the currency in the UAE and the money was released.

TFG officials have indicated that the money was not counterfeited and its printing was requested by them from a company in Indonesia. It is likely that the money was finally delivered to the TFG.

IV. Transport

As has been noted in abundant detail elsewhere in this report - **Section II Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period** – both states and arms trading networks have been relying on all manor of transport - motorized road vehicles, maritime vessels, and aircraft - to deliver their cargo of arms, military materiel, combat troops, and other forms of support to both the TFG and ICU. Large

[4] Zakat: Refers to spending a fixed portion of one's wealth for the poor, needy.

aircraft and dhows have been arriving at seaports and airports virtually on a continuous basis and at an exceptionally high rate, a rate that has not been seen by the Monitoring Group during past mandates. During the current reporting period, approximately 26 maritime vessels including dhows have landed at Somali seaports. The vessels have used ports located along most of the coastline of Somalia including from Puntland in the north to Lower Jubba in the south. And similarly, a total of approximately 52 aircraft have arrived in different airfields and airports located throughout most of Somalia. The combined total of dhow and aircraft arrivals comes to 78 and covers a time period of about five (5) months. The Monitoring Group believes that this figure represents only a sub-set, or a portion, of the total that have actually come into Somalia – exact numbers being unknown.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning in general that the process involving the transport of arms, military materiel, combat troops, and other forms of support from point of origin to Somalia has, as a rule, been deliberately made clandestine in an attempt by the numerous suppliers to avoid discovery by unwanted parties – including the Monitoring Group. Of particular interest are the air transport cases of ERIKO ENTERPRISE, Asmara, Eritrea, and the B-707 of Euro Oceanic Air Transport, Ltd, also reported in **Section II Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period**. In these cases, the Monitoring Group has observed that the parties involved in the transport process took additional clandestine measures including adding different commercial layers of participants between the source of the cargo and the eventual recipients. They also filed false and deceptive flights including declaring the wrong destinations. Finally, as an added ruse, while in flight the aircraft operators avoided making any contacts with Regional air traffic controllers.

V. Analysis of trends and patterns

A. The ICU as the pre-eminent military force in Somalia

The strongly sustained trend toward total military, economic and political dominance by the ICU (formerly referred to as the militant Islamic fundamentalists in the MG's previous reports) in central and southern Somalia continues. They are currently the most powerful force in Somalia and the single most immediate threat to the existence of the TFG. And, while the TFG has received large quantities of arms and military materiel, the ICU has been the recipient of larger quantities, and more diverse and sophisticated types of arms. They have also received large amounts of military materiel and financial support.

On its rise to pre-eminence, the ICU neutralized or subdued other major powerful elements in central and southern Somalia including the former Mogadishu based, opposition alliance, the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA), based at Kismaayo, and maritime pirates.

The spreading control of the ICU over the southern and central parts of Somalia has had a severe dampening effect on the activities of maritime piracy in the waters off the Somali coast. After declaring piracy illegal, the ICU took over Harardheere (central coast), which has been the pivotal area for the main group of Somali pirates – the Somali "Marines", also referred to as "Defenders of Somali Territorial Waters" – that had been the principal threat to maritime shipping in Somali coastal

waters. Since eliminating that pirate group, there have been no acts of piracy along the central and southern coastal area.

Although not monolithic, the ICU, nevertheless, may be characterized, as follows: they are focused, and have the drive and will to pursue their aims; they are proactive; they have a master plan, and strategies for accomplishing their plan that is substantially supported by elements from outside of Somalia – strategic guidance; and they are also operationally and tactically guided and directed with the help of outsiders; they have organization, cohesion – notwithstanding internal disagreements – and discipline; and importantly, they have the means.

Means effectively consists of overall military capability including an increasingly organized military-style force - versus a patchwork of independently operating militias; military command and control; military advice, direction and guidance; diverse forms of military training; arms and the military materiel and logistics necessary to support military operations; financial and economic strength - both internally self generated, through large and affiliated business operations, and gifts and donations from outside of Somalia. They also rely to a very considerable extent on state support including from Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria to maintain their military capability. In sum, their objective successes are as much a clear manifestation of the combined effect of all of these characteristics, as it is a demonstration of their intent.

In an effort to consolidate and strengthen their hold on newly obtained areas of central and southern Somalia, the ICU has been refining their internal organizations and structures to meet the challenges of their rise to power. They have established command and control centres (inclusive of politics, economics and military operations) in different geographical areas under their control including Marka (Lower Shabelle Region) and Guriel (near Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud Region), in addition to Mogadihsu. They have also deployed units of their military force to those areas, along with distributing the necessary armaments to the units to allow them to maintain military superiority.

The ICU has established numerous military training facilities throughout central and southern Somalia and has been actively recruiting new Somali militia members. Foreign volunteers (fighters) have also been arriving in considerable numbers to give added military strength to the ICU. An unknown number of the volunteers, but believed by the MG to be significant, have combat experience gained from participation in wars and hostile conflicts and actions in the Middle East and Asia. Volunteers with this type of experience add the all-important aspect of reality to military training and combat, and greater insight to the leadership of the ICU.

ICU military training includes the instruction on conventional military tactics. But, importantly, foreign volunteers also provide training in guerrilla warfare and special topics or techniques consisting of bomb making and the use of bombs against different targets such as a variety of different types of transport and buildings. Other techniques include kidnapping and the conduct of assassination by ambush and sniping. It is the view of the MG that the ICU is fully capable of potentially turning Somalia into what is currently an Iraq-type scenario,

replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations and other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities.

In sum, it is the view of the MG that the very core of the ICU's strength and ability to maintain their position of dominance comes from outside Somalia. The know-how, the arms, military materiel, and financial support chiefly come from outside Somalia and are essentially arms embargo violations. Without these forms of support, the ICU would have the will, but not the means. However, as of the writing of this report, means continue to flow to the ICU.

Further, it is the view of the MG that the ICU is well prepared, in all essential military aspects, as outlined above, to wage a violent, widespread and protracted conflict in defence of its gains in Somalia. As an example, on Sunday, 24 September 2006, the ICU took control of the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) stronghold of Kismaayo and its environs. The JVA stronghold was under the long term leadership of warlord Colonel Bare Hiraale, who had also been named to the post of Minister of Defense of the TFG.

The takeover of Kismaayo by the ICU, under the command of Sheik Hassan Turki, came as little surprise to the arms experts of the MG who had previously learned that the ICU wanted to control Kismaayo in order to deny it as a possible forward base and logistical hub for any attempted deployment of a foreign peace keeping force to Somalia. ICU military forces that took control over Kismaayo consisted of a coalition of troops from the Sharia Courts, Eritrea, ONLF and the OLF.

B. State support and groups of combatants inside Somalia, and military build-up

The overall military strength and power of the TFG is diminutive when compared to that of the ICU. Nonetheless, the TFG is also supported with arms, military materiel and foreign military personnel in violation of the arms embargo. And, similar to the ICU, the very essence of TFG military support - the means - comes from outside of Somalia. Both sides are overwhelmingly reliant on states for support, but also, to a lesser degree, on powerful individuals and groups existing on the territories of those same states and elsewhere. And, because the TFG and the ICU are the principal contenders for ultimate control of political power in, and of, Somalia, each with their own dedicated state supporters, the result is an aggressive, and by Somali standards, large, and deliberate military build-up on both sides. The support received from outside of Somalia is, *de facto*, life-sustaining for the TFG and the ICU, and all in violation of the arms embargo.

Of particular concern, as a case in point, is the most crucial aspect of state support for the military build-up – armaments. It is indicated from an analysis of all information obtained by the MG during the present mandate that arms embargo violations involving arms, per se, have been rampant. In particular, for example, as detailed above in Section II regarding arms embargo violations, in addition to the sheer numbers of arms involved in the violations, the different and new types of arms brought into Somalia represent a dangerous escalation in the level of sophistication of weaponry, adding a new and more deadly dimension to the arms inventory in Somalia. The ICU has been the recipient of the new types of arms. And, as also mentioned in the same Section, most prominent among the new weapons are the man portable surface to air missiles such as the Strela-2 and 2M, also known as the

SA-7a and 7b 'Grail', and the SA-6 'Gainful' Low to Medium Altitude surface to air missile. Other new types of arms include multiple rocket launchers, and second generation, infrared-guided anti-tank weapons.

More broadly, the principal sources for the overall military build-up involving arms, military materiel and foreign military personnel can be variously attributed to ten (10) states, as follows: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda and Yemen. Of the foregoing states, seven (7) are aligned with the ICU, as follows: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria; the remaining three (3) states, Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen, are aligned with the TFG.

Not included in the foregoing is Lebanon, whose territory is being used by the Hizbollah who have created a reciprocal relationship of assistance with the ICU. Also not included is a complete list of the states from where volunteers originate in support of the ICU, or states from where individuals or groups send monetary contributions to either the TFG or the ICU.

At the same time, military build-up facilitated by aggressive state support not only perpetuates widespread instability and rising tensions, but, also helps to sustain a clearly discernible momentum toward the possibility of a major military conflict involving most of Somalia - Puntland in the north, and central and southern Somalia, Somaliland excepted for the moment. And, further aggravating and contributing to this momentum toward possible conflict is the direct involvement <u>inside</u> Somalia of the military personnel of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda - all members of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development). Consequently, there exists the not unlikely prospect of violent confrontations inside Somalia between the military personnel of these states, since Ethiopia and Uganda support the TFG and Eritrea supports the ICU.

Moreover, in addition to the presence inside Somalia of military personnel of those states, further seriously complicating the security situation is the existence of other groups of combatants, also inside of Somalia, that are aligned either with the TFG or the ICU, as follows: in support of TFG militias are some members of the former opposition alliance and Mogadishu based warlords, Puntland militias, Ethiopian combat units and members of the Ugandan military – five (5) groups; and in support of the ICU Sharia Courts are the Ethiopian insurgent groups ONLF and OLF, foreign volunteers, or fighters (many with combat experience and specialized military skills), and Eritrean combat units – five (5) groups. Thus, the two (2) coalitions effectively have a total number of ten (10) distinct groups of potential combatants inside of Somalia.

It is into this highly unstable, complicated and militarily diverse environment that the Regional and international community is actively considering inserting a peace keeping force consisting of military troops from the IGAD or the AU. It is the firmly held view of the MG that committing such a force to Somalia in the current context may in the worst case be the catalyst that sparks a serious military confrontation between the opposing sides, or at a minimum simply adds to the pressing momentum toward a confrontation. And, given the situation as

described above, what control would such a foreign peace keeping force be able to exercise? In virtually any case, there is a very good likelihood that instead of curbing tensions, a peace keeping force would simply become a part of the problem - another potential combatant in the push toward a military solution in Somalia.

C. The re-emergence of the Somali warlords – former members of the opposition alliance

The Mogadishu based opposition alliance that has for so long ruled over the area under their control through a patchwork of individual fiefdoms, or local administrations, were decisively beaten in a series of military style engagements by the ICU and have vacated the areas formerly under their control. The ICU has moved in to fill the void left by the alliance. Accordingly, the ICU took control of the revenue generating resources of the local administrations, recruited militia formerly belonging to the warlords and confiscated large quantities of a wide variety of abandoned arms. The Monitoring Group believes that it had already documented during previous mandates a considerable portion of the confiscated arms as being involved in arms embargo violations.

The ICU seized heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns and large amounts of ammunition from individual warlords including Mohamed Qanyare – former TFG Minister of National Security, Mohamed Dheere – Governor of Middle Shabelle, and Abdi Qeybdiid, warlord, south Mogadishu. Many of the confiscated weapons were mounted on technicals, which were seized along with armored personnel carriers.

In addition to confiscation of arms and military materiel belonging to various members of the opposition alliance, many of the militias belonging to those same members have been converted to the ranks of the ICU. Of those that weren't killed in combat, some fled, but hundreds of fighters representing a number of the defeated warlords, along with their weapons, joined the ICU. The Monitoring Group also learned that several hundred members of the TFG militias also joined the ICU.

Notwithstanding the defeat and subsequent dispersal of members of the opposition alliance, the Monitoring Group has learned that some members, including Mohamed Qanyare, Mohamed Dheere and Abdi Qeybdiid, are re-organizing and re-arming themselves for the fundamental reason of attempting to re-take those local administrations in and around Mogadishu that they lost to the ICU. All initial indications are that their intentions are to use military force against the ICU. Attempts to forcefully take back their former fiefdoms will only make worse an already tense and highly explosive situation in central and southern Somalia.

The TFG and the Ethiopian military have gained the support of the same warlords in order to form a coalition that will be used to defend the areas under the influence of the TFG and to protect certain border areas with Ethiopia. As of the writing of this report, the same coalition has also been joined by Puntland forces for the purpose of defending Galkayo against a possible attack by ICU military forces.

As the MG has detailed elsewhere in this report, the Ethiopian Government is supporting both the TFG and the former Somali warlords - a contradiction. It is the view of the MG that the principal reason behind the re-emerging Somali warlords is to regain their respective former vested interests

comprising of individual fiefdoms complete with political and economic benefits. Their purpose is not too assist in the establishment of the TFG as a viable Government This contradictory activity clearly indicates the self-serving nature of Ethiopian support to Somalia.

VI. Capacity-building

In view of the totality of the information provided in this report describing the highly dangerous and volatile military and security situation inside of Somalia and, further, the deep involvement of certain Regional states, including members of IGAD, in support of either the TFG or the ICU, the Monitoring Group is of the belief that proposing capacity building measures in the current environment is impractical.

VII. Coordination with States and organizations

A. States

Due process

The Monitoring Group sent 54 letters to individual States and businesses identified in connection with information about alleged involvement in arms embargo violations, as noted in section II above. Replies received by the Monitoring Group by the time of the completion of the present report have been cited in the information on alleged arms embargo violations in section II and are reproduced in the annexes. Information concerning arms shipments reported to have taken place was sometimes not sent to the respective governments for a response, as the Monitoring Group received such information only after dispatch of its letters. After all of the letters were sent, United Nations-NY, Secretariat, followed up with telephone calls in an attempt to encourage replies from the numerous recipients.

Somalia

On 19 June 2006 the Chairman of the Monitoring Group met with the TFG Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, and exchanged views on the arms embargo.

Germany, Kazakhstan and the UAE

The Monitoring Group is very appreciative of the cooperation and specific investigative assistance extended to it by the Government of Germany, Kazakhstan and the UAE through their letters dated 27 July 2006, 19 September 2006 and 3 October 2006, respectively. The Monitoring Group looks forward to continued cooperation with the Governments of Germany, Kazakhstan and the UAE in the future.

B.Organizations

United Nations

Members of the Monitoring Group met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, François Lonseny Fall and his Deputy on several occasions during which they exchanged views and information.

On 9 October 2006, at Nairobi, Kenya, at the request of SRSG Fall, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and the arms expert provided a substantive briefing on arms embargo violations in relation to the current military build up and security situation in Somalia to the "Inter-Mission Cooperation Meeting: UNMEE, UNMIS, UNPOS".

African Union

On 25 August 2006, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group, together with the arms expert held a meeting with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, to discuss the arms embargo, the associated military build up, and the overall threat of an outbreak of civil war in Somalia and its potential negative repercussions for the Region. (Annex XXIII).

Somali Donor Group and Finland (EU-Presidency)

On 14 June and 23 August 2006, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group, together with the arms expert, met with the Somali Donor Group and the Ambassador of Finland, respectively, and provided a briefing on the arms embargo and related matters.

VIII.Conclusions and recommendations

A.Conclusions

In an environment of steadily rising tensions and deep anxieties, the ICU and the TFG are in a bitter contest for control of Somalia. However, the TFG is no match for the ICU - a powerful, expanding, organized, and focused organization in control of most of central and southern Somalia. The TFG, on the other hand, is considerably weaker and lacking in focus; it is highly internally divided and controls little of Somalia. The contest is overwhelmingly military in nature with rampant arms flows to both sides. The arms flows are a premier part of a deliberate, ongoing and broader military build-up, also taking place on both sides.

Aggressive state support from both inside and outside of Somalia provides the main means for the military build-up and is one of the key reasons driving the rising tensions. A multitude of other organized groups of combatants supporting either the TFG or the ICU from inside of Somalia are also key elements in an increasingly threatening security mosaic.

Somalia is a complicated and potentially volatile military mix, a hostile environment that seems to be moving irresistibly toward playing host to an unnecessary war, a war that may be widespread, and, quite likely, protracted and unconventional. A widespread and protracted war in Somalia involving not only the ICU and the TFG, per se, but the multitude of other combatants has clear Regional implications including the reasonable possibility of re-igniting a state-to-state war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and fomenting acts of terrorism in very vulnerable neighbouring states.

An alternative to this potentially highly destructive <u>military solution</u> in an intensely complex and aggravated scenario that defines present-day Somalia remains a possibility and is within the grasp of the international community. A combination of stronger enforcement of the arms embargo applied in conjunction with certain economic sanctions and high-level diplomatic and political efforts could

offset the momentum toward a catastrophic conflict in Somalia, a conflict with clearly dangerous implications for the Horn of Africa and East Africa.

B.Recommendations

In view of the unprecedented and highly exacerbated security situation in Somalia, the MG proposes a new and inter-related set of recommendations that are intended to reduce the level of tension and offset the continuous momentum toward a military catastrophe in Somalia. In brief, the new recommendations call for (1) increasing the strength of the arms embargo through an all-border surveillance and interdiction effort for Somalia, (2) the application of financial sanctions on significant Somali owned and operated business entities, and (3) a high level, international diplomatic and political effort intended to encourage the will in states in the Region to avert war, and further, to give cause for states to disengage from contributing to the military buildup in Somalia

Past recommendations put forward by the MG were predicated both on an analysis of the information available and a sense, or perception, of what measures may best serve to curb arms embargo violations, thereby providing sufficient room for the implementation of alternatively constructive political and social measures. However, no past recommendations have been implemented. Consequently - arguably - the security situation in Somalia has continued to dramatically deteriorate, resulting in an explosion of arms flows, wider militarization of society and, eventually, the ongoing and broad military buildup of the two (2) major contenders for control of Somalia, all in violation of the arms embargo. As a result, the MG sees the need to propose a new and equally dramatic set of inter-related recommendations that are intended to effectively neutralize the more threatening security scenario that is now in evidence in Somalia.

In view of the information that the MG has put forward to the Security Council for its consideration in the form of numerous reports and briefings, and its cumulative knowledge and experience investigating various aspects of the situation in Somalia in connection with specific arms embargo violations, and the broader security environment in general, the MG is of the firmly held view that the current relentless momentum toward a violent confrontation between the TFG and the ICU, and their respective coalitions, may create a protracted and widespread civil war, accompanied by major losses of life and a large displacement of Somalis into neighboring countries, and Regional acts of terrorism.

Therefore, to offset this increasingly apparent possibility, and to simultaneously curb arms flows and retard the ongoing military buildup, the MG proposes that the Security Council consider implementing a number of inter-related recommendations for Somalia. The conceptual framework for this approach involves three (3) aspects, as outlined below:

1) Strengthen the arms embargo with the intention of severely curtailing or cutting-off arms flows into Somalia by implementing a total border surveillance and interdiction effort involving a combination of sea, air and land military forces supported by other organizations, as follows: sea - employ the naval forces of Regional maritime states and international naval forces present in the Region, assisted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Maritime Bureau (IMB); air – employ the air forces of Regional states and international air forces present in the Region, assisted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); and land – employ a UN observer mission,

assisted by customs authorities of Regional and other states. Design a practical and working mix of the foregoing to help in the enforcement of the arms embargo on Somalia through the activities of surveillance and interdiction of arms, military materiel and other forms of military support, as necessary, that violate the arms embargo;

2) A financial assets freeze on all Somali owned and operated businesses located both inside and outside of Somalia that have a relationship to either the TFG or the ICU and whose assets have been, or may be, used to support the purchase of arms, military materiel and/or to provide military training, or otherwise support activities prohibited under the arms embargo; and

3) A concerted and immediate international political and diplomatic initiative - fully incorporating Regional actors - to accomplish, among other things, the following: a) to draw to the attention of all states in the Region, and elsewhere, that are involved in supporting either the TFG or the ICU to the big-picture momentum toward the very real possibility of an extended war and military conflict in the Horn of Africa; b) to encourage among those states the <u>will</u> to avert a possible military catastrophe in the Horn of Africa; c) work toward disengaging those states that are actively and unilaterally supporting either the TFG or the ICU with arms or other military materiel in violation of the arms embargo; and d) provide guidance, direction and coordination, and encourage the involvement of all essential Somali actors in meaningful political dialogue leading toward a political solution of the Somali situation.

In summary, there are two fundamental underlying reasons for the proposed recommendations, as follows: 1) in the near term – calm or quiet the tensions and volatility of the current situation in Somalia, and, thereby slow and, perhaps, divert the existing momentum toward military confrontation, and 2) in the longer term – gain the time necessary for diplomacy to seek a political solution for Somalia.

Annex I

Djibouti Airlines response to the Monitoring Group

DJIBOUTI AIRLINES الخطوط الجويّة الجيبوتيـة

Bruno Scheimsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia

Date: 20/08/06
Réf: DJB/MRW- 275

Dear Sir.

In reference to your letter dated **18 August 2006** concerning the transportation of medicine and uniform by Djibouti Airlines "to militant Islamic fundamentalist", we are surprised to heard such unfounded accusation.

As a Djiboutian Airlines operator, we are abide by the Djiboutian Law which in compliance with the measures imposed by the Security Council resolution 733 (1992) do not authorize export of items with military use in Somalia.

Besides, the Djibouti Red Crescent Society never chartered our flights for a cargo of this kind neither in July nor before. The daily flight report of Djibouti International Airport can fully confirm that no aircraft belonging to Djibouti Airlines have operated to Mogadishu or its area on 30th July 2006.

In addition, Djibouti Airlines has in no time intended to assist any Somalia group or acted in violation of UN resolution. Moreover, we are constantly fostering peace and order in line with the Djiboutian government objective of establishing peace in Somalia and in accord with our policy of increasing the market share by taking advantage of the potential Somalia market.

Djibouti Airlines is ready to assist the monitoring group to identify the real perpetrator and are reminding to the concerned to stay more vigilant about those who are trying to tarnish the image of Djibouti Airlines on baseless information.

Looking forwards for your sincere cooperation.

Best regards.

CAPT MOUSSA R. WABERI
CHAIRMAN

Annex II

Djibouti Red Crescent response to the Monitoring Group

V/Réf.
N/Réf. AKB/SN/399/06

SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE
DU CROISSANT-ROUGE DE DJIBOUTI

جمعية الهلال الاحمر
جيبوتي

Le secrétaire général

Djibouti, le 06 SEP. 2006

A

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT DE LA COMMISSION
CHARGE DE L'APPLICATION DE L'EMBARGO
SUR LES ARMES CONTRE LA SOMALIE

Monsieur le Président de la Commission,

C'est avec étonnement et surprise que nous avons appris par votre courrier du 18 août 2006 d'une éventuelle violation de la résolution 733-1992 du conseil de sécurité par notre Société nationale.

Il s'agit là d'une grave accusation qui met en cause l'intégrité et la crédibilité de notre société.

Nous avons l'honneur de vous communiquer la réalité des faits et les observations suivantes :

- L'avion affrété n'est pas Djibouti Air-Lines, comme mentionné dans votre courrier, mais un appareil de la compagnie Dallo Airlines loué par le C.I.C.R à la demande du Croissant Rouge de Djibouti et du Croissant Rouge Somalien.

- Quand au contenu de chargement, il s'agissait bien des médicaments emballés et étiquetés par les volontaires du Croissant Rouge de Djibouti destinés au Croissant Rouge somalien pour venir en aide aux victimes du conflit qui a opposé les membres des tribunaux Islamiques d'une part aux chefs de guerre somaliens d'autre part.

- Il est à noter que les coûts de transport ont été pris en charge par la délégation régionale du C.I.C.R à Nairobi et que ledit chargement était convoyé par un représentant du Croissant Rouge de Djibouti. Le bureau logistique du C.I.C.R à Mogadisho a réceptionné les médicaments. Par ailleurs, il ne s'agit pas d'un vol mais de deux vols qui ont eu lieu respectivement le 18 mai 2006 et le 20 juin 2006 d'un total de 31 Tonnes. L'avion a atterri à l'aéroport situé au Kilomètre cinquante dans la région de Lower-Chebeley (Marka) et non pas à l'aéroport de Mogadishio, fermé pour cause du conflit en cette période.

- Le don est octroyé par le Croissant Rouge de Djibouti au Croissant Rouge Somalien et par le biais du C.I.C.R. Il ne s'agit nullement d'uniformes militaires mais bien des médicaments.

Il me semble tout à fait légitime de demander l'excuse de la part de ceux qui ont propagé de telles informations préjudiciables à l'image de la Société nationale.

Le Croissant Rouge de Djibouti se réserve le droit de porter plainte contre les auteurs de telles accusations.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président de la Commission, à l'assurance de ma considération très distingué.

Le Secrétaire Général

Mr ABDI KHAIREH BOUH

Annex III

Government of Egypt response to the Monitoring Group

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

2 October 2006

Sir,

I wish to refer to your letter no. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.59 dated 19 September 2006 regarding the alleged provision by the Government of Egypt of training in support of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia in violation of the Security Council resolution 733 (1992) imposing general and complete arms embargo on Somalia. In this regard, and upon instructions from my government, I wish to convey to you the following in response to the allegations contained in your aforementioned letter:

1- The information contained in the aforementioned letter referring to possible participation by Egyptian senior military officers in a meeting or activities aimed at providing training or any type of military support to ICU is totally baseless and completely false.

2- The commitment of the Government of Egypt to respect and to implement all Security Council resolutions is genuine and applies to all United Nations decisions and resolutions without distinction.

Sincerely,

Maged Abdelaziz
Ambassador & Permanent Representative

Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1676 (2006)
Room S-3055

Annex IV

Daallo Airlines response to the Monitoring Group

22nd August 2006

To: Ms. Loraine Rickard-Martin
Acting Secretary
Security Council Committee
United Nation

Sub: Your Fax / Letter Ref. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.45

I refer to above fax/letter addressed to DAALLO Airlines with regards to operations of AB-310-300 on 20/21 July 2006 in/out Assab, I would like to clarify and respond to your report as follows.

First and foremost, DAALLO Airlines has never owned, leased or ever operated AB310 since its inception in 1991. DAALLO Airlines operates only: B737, B767, B757 in our European and Middle Eastern routes, and AN-24, AN-12, IL-18, Let-410 and initially in 1991, one Cessna aircraft in the Horn of Africa, we also operated IL-76 to Kenya and Uganda, hence your information with regards to AB310 is incorrect.

DAALLO Airlines is a commercial airline and is aware of all IATA resolutions on Dangerous Goods and will, in no way permit the airline to carry such cargo without authorization and specifically as it is against any UN resolutions on humanity.

In the entire history of DAALLO Airlines, we have never been involved in any illegitimate business, our track records with UN is untainted and transparent.

DAALLO Airlines has maintained good reputation with many NGOs and UN organization offices and offer services to the communities, and relief organizations such as UNDP, WFO etc for over the last 10 years and have never been involved in political or siding with any part thereof, our mission is clear and is simply, to provide transportation service to the legitimate community in the Horn of Africa connecting to the Global Village.

At this point, we cannot help but feel that your sources had purposely made up this story to impair the airlines' reputation and image, that I can assure the accusation is baseless and unacceptable.

We therefore, ask you to refer back to your source of information in order to get accurate information and erase the false accusations against us, we are deeply concerned that the contents of the report are a direct accusation and an insult to our reputation.

What surprises us the most, is that the sources were able to describe in detail, the cargo that was on board the aircraft and failed to describe the registration of the aircraft which is clearly marked and printed on the fuselage, these markings are normally visible to all, this by itself indicates intentional fabrication of the story. The question is how it was assumed that the aircraft was DAALLO Airlines.

For your information and let this be on the record, we do not take this matter lightly, we took the liberty to contact and investigate our on-line destinations, only our offices at Mogadishu have advised us that on the 20/21 July 2006 an IL-76 Registration 7607 landed in Mogadishu, however, this was not a DAALLO Airlines operated aircraft as we do not have any record of any movement on that day neither have we filed any flight plan with any authority to operate an IL-76. Furthermore, all the other stations has confirmed that, no such aircraft of any size close to what you have mentioned has landed at their respective airports.

Additionally, I am sure you are aware that AB-310 cannot land in Mogadishu or K50 airport, or any other airports in Somali due to runway problems and sizes. You have not specified the airport used in Somalia, hence we are not in a position to help on further information.

For your easy reference, I have attached two news articles from CNN and Sudan Tribune that clearly disproves that the aircraft in question is NOT DAALLO Airlines.

Last but not least, in this context we would like your confirmation to have DAALLO Airlines removed on the list of suspect of arms smuggling should this be the case.

Should you need further information, do not hesitate to contact myself.

Best regards,

P.O. Box 21297
DUBAI
DAALLO AIRLINES

Abdul Wahid Al Hashmy
General Manager

CC: Mr. Bruno Schiiemsky UN-MGS/CEO & CHAIRMAN DAALLO Airline

Annex V

Government of Eritrea response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of Eritrea
to the United Nations

የዋሚ ልኡኽ ኤርትራ ናብ ውድብ ሕቡራት ኮሪት
البعثة الأرترية الدائمة لدى الأمم المتحدة

22 August 2006

Dear Mr. Schiemsky,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 18 August 2006 regarding the information that the Monitoring Group received on alleged violations by Eritrea of the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia.

Eritrea rejects the alleged arms embargo violations mentioned in the letter and it is regrettable that such misinformation continues to spread around with the clear objective of tainting the image of Eritrea in the African sub-region. Eritrea's principled position of non-interference in the internal affairs of Somalia is well known to the international community. One way of putting such groundless accusations, which are finding their way in the work of the Monitoring Group, to rest is by revealing the sources of such information. Therefore, my Government demands for the sources of your information to be disclosed without delay.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Tesfa A. Seyoum

Tesfa Alem Seyoum
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1676 (2006)
United Nations
New York

800 Second Avenue, 18th Floor • New York, NY 10017 • Telephone (212) 687-3390 • Telefax (212) 687-3138 • E-mail: mission@eritrea-un.org

Annex VI

Government of Eritrea response to the Monitoring Group

06 September 2006

Dear Mr. Schiemsky,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 01 September 2006 regarding the information the Monitoring Group received on the alleged departure of an Illyshin 76 (IL-76) aircraft from Assab, Eritrea, to Mogadishu, Somalia.

The Government of the State of Eritrea does not have any information on the arrival or departure of the stated aircraft. The Government of the State of Eritrea is gravely concerned about the continued spread of misinformation on Eritrea's alleged violations of Security Council resolution 733 (1992).

As repeatedly expressed to the Monitoring Group in previous letters of the Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea, dated 27 March 2006 and 22 August 2006, the information received by the Monitoring Group is totally wrong and lacks credibility. The unfounded information is, unfortunately, contributing to misleading and fictitious reports helping to divert the attention of the international community from the direct intervention of others in the internal affairs of Somalia under the pretext of preserving ones national security and vital interests in the Horn of Africa.

The Government of the State of Eritrea stands by its stated policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Somalia and it remains fully committed to the arms embargo on Somalia.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Araya Desta
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman, Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1676 (2006)
United Nations, New York

Annex VII

Government of Kazakhstan response to the Monitoring Group

БІРІККЕН ҰЛТТАР ҰЙЫМЫ
ЖАНЫНДАҒЫ ҚАЗАҚСТАН
РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫНЫҢ
ТҰРАҚТЫ ӨКІЛІ

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE REPUBLIC
OF KAZAKHSTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

866 UN PLAZA • SUITE 586 • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
Tel 212.230.1900 • Fax 212.230.1172
kazakhstan@un.int

№991

New York, 19 September 2006

Dear Mr. Schiemsky,

With reference to your letter (ref.# S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.34) dated 15 August 2006 please find attached information concerning the aircraft Ilyushin 76 collected on the basis of thorough investigation by the law enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan (see annex).

Since this issue is under investigation by the law enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan we would highly appreciate it if the Monitoring Group on Somalia would provide us with further possible information concerning the case.

Please accept, Mr. Schiemsky, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yerzhan Kh. Kazykhanov

Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1630 (2005)

New York

Translated from Russian

In regard to the inquiry regarding the IL-76 aircraft

Fifteen IL-76 aircraft were registered in the State Aircraft Registry of Kazakhstan as of July 2006, and are operated by five Kazakh airlines. Of those, only two aircraft (registration Nos. UN76371 and UN76374), which belong to the *Berkut* State airline of the Presidential administration, bear an image of the national flag on the vertical tail unit. According to data from the State Enterprise *Kazaeronavigatsia*, the aircraft in question made no flights in July 2006.

The other aircraft, in compliance with the requirements currently in force in Kazakhstan, bear an image of the national flag of Kazakhstan on both sides of the nose section of the fuselage, near the cockpit, of a size proportionate to the inscription of the name of the operating airline. There is reliable information for 14 of the aircraft on where they are based and the flights they made in July of this year which indicates that they were not involved in weapons transport.

Somewhat incomplete information has been received only in regard to aircraft UN76496, which was rented by the Kazakh airline GST Aero from the airline Overseas Cargo FZE (United Arab Emirates). According to documents received by the Civil Aviation Committee of Kazakhstan, the airline which owns this aircraft sold it on 20 July 2006 to the South African airline Aerolift, in connection with which the rental agreement was cancelled. The relevant request to remove the aircraft from the State Aircraft Registry of Kazakhstan (No. 092 of 20 July 2006) was received from GST Aero by the Civil Aviation Committee. Following a review, certification of the removal of the aircraft from the State Aircraft Registry of Kazakhstan was issued on 2 August 2006.

On 24 July 2006, however, an aircraft manned by a GST Aero crew, using a certificate of registration with the State Aircraft Registry of Kazakhstan, an airworthiness certificate and other previously issued documents, as well as identifying markings of the Kazakh company, carried out a technical flight from the city of Fujairah (United Arab Emirates) to Massawa (Eritrea) to transfer the aircraft to a new owner. The same day, following the transfer, the aircraft's documents were removed, as were the identifying national and registration markings. What happened to this aircraft after that is not known.

Although the symbol "UN" is indeed the code symbol of Kazakhstan, there was no image of the flag of Kazakhstan on the tail of the above-mentioned aircraft. Furthermore, the LTF call sign is not used by Kazakh airlines.

Given the foregoing, media reports on possible involvement by Kazakh nationals in weapons shipments to Somalia are unfounded.

Annex VIII

Aerolift response (e-mail) to the Monitoring Group

TO : Secretary Security Council Committee UN
Mr. Gregory Boventer
REF : IL-76 operation to Mogadishu
FROM : Evgueny Zakharov /AEROLIFT company
DATE : 29-09-2006
Dear Mr. Gregory Boventer ,

Refer to your letters dated 19/09/2006 and 27/09/2006 I would like to confirm the following information on behalf of AEROLIFT company :

1. AEROLIFT company purchased IL-76 aircraft REG: UN-76496 from "Overseas Cargo FZE" (UAE) for purpose to resale it to Eritrean company "ERIKO ENTERPRISE" .

2. "ERICO ENTERPRISE" and AEROLIFT company agreed that during lease-purchase period "ERIKO ENTERPRISE " will operate under Eritrean AOC (Aircraft Operators License) and may use AEROLIFT call sign "LFT" until they will get their own ICAO call sign .

3. The conditions "ERICO ENTERPRISE" using AEROLIFT call sign aircraft will not transport drugs, arms and will operate under ICAO regulations .

4. AEROLIFT suspended agreement with "ERICO ENTERPRISE " at the moment.

5. AEROLIFT sent copy's of Your letters to "ERICO ENTERPRISE " and requested them to provide information you need a.s.a.p.

Please do not hesitate contact directly to "ERIKO ENTERPRISE " :
ERIKO ENTERPRISE
P.O. Box 9302 Asmara, Eretria
Tel. 002911122144&122806
Fax. 002911123137
e-mail: horneriko@yahoo.com
Mr. T. Tango cell: 002917116579.
P.S. I will be traveling next 2 weeks and for quick communication please use email evguenyz@aerolift.org or contact my mobile number +27724616361 .
With regards , Evgueny Zakharov .

Annex IX

Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd document to the Monitoring Group

SKY JET AVIATION (U) LTD

Date: 10/10/2006

Sent to : **The director Air Navigation & Regulatory Services**
Subject : **B707 Reg. 5X-EOT M.S.N.19821**

Total pages attached including this cover (02 pages)

Dear sir,
Ref. to our letter dated 04/09/2006 faxed to you in relation to the B707 Reg. 5X-EOT (copy attached) requesting your urgent action to contact the UAE Civil Aviation to ground the A/C at FJR where it was parked & to withdraw all documents on board the A/C but no action been taken. As a result Euro-Oceanic Air Transport took the Aircraft yesterday from FJR and operating **ILLEGAL ARMS TRANSPORT FLIGHTS** between MASAWA/ERITERIA and MOGADISHU/SOMALIA.

Appreciate your immediate action with both Somali CAA and Eritrean CAA.

With my best regards

Hamdy M. Eisa

Chairman

P.O. BOX 7594 KAMPALA – UGANDA
TEL : + 256 41 320199 - FAX : + 256 41 320156
Mobile : + 256 77 822075

Annex X

Government of Ethiopia response to the Monitoring Group

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

866 Second Avenue, 3rd Floor • New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel.: (212) 421-1830 • Fax: (212) 754-0360

Date: 9 October 2006
EPM 255 /06

Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter Ref:S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.52, dated 15, September 2006, in which various instances of violations by Ethiopia on the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by Security Council Resolution 733(1992) has been communicated.

First of all, we wish to acknowledge how vital the work being done is by the Monitoring Group is in helping Somalia and the region as whole to achieve peace and stability. Ethiopia has been doing whatever it can to facilitate the work of the Monitoring Group, and will continue to do its level best to help the Group discharge its heavy responsibilities.

With respect to the allegations contained in the letter, without attributing any malice to anyone, we have found that many of the allegations are without basis, and in many cases it has been extremely difficult to conduct investigations because of the manifestly erroneous information contained therein, such as names of officers that are not in the Ethiopian army. Of course we will continue to investigate these allegations but we

H.E. Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman,
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council Resolution 1676(2005)
New York

can assure you that it has been extremely difficult for us to get to the bottom of these allegations because of what appears to be fabricated information contained in the letter. We indeed understand how difficult it might be to the Monitoring Group that under the circumstances prevailing in Somalia the Monitoring Group it had to rely on information that is usually difficult to verify.

However, what the Ethiopian Government has found most distressing is the fact that the current context in Somalia has been overlooked in all these. The Horn of Africa region is currently the target of active destabilization by dangerous international terrorist groups. There is no exaggeration in saying that Ethiopia and the sub-region are confronted with a growing menace in connection with the activities of these groups.

Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that Ethiopia has no problem with the ascendancy of strong Islamic sentiments in Somalia. Accordingly the emergence of the Consultative Council of Islamic Courts (CCIC) is not Ethiopia's preoccupation *per se*. I have to emphasize this because there is a lot of distortion in the international media with regard to Ethiopia's policy towards Somalia and the CCIC. Ethiopia's concern and the concern of the sub-region emanates from the fact that the extremists within the CCIC have made it absolutely clear that theirs is not a purely Somali agenda. Some of the leaders, including those who are calling the shots at the present time in Mogadishu, have made it clear that they do not respect the territorial integrity of countries neighboring Somalia, and that they will not be bound by international law. Some of these people have a track record which makes them a major threat to peace and stability in the region.

As would be recalled, the CCIC had its first meeting with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia in June in Khartoum during which they agreed on a cease fire and to resolve whatever problems they may have between them through dialogue and peaceful means. But events since then have shown that the CCIC has absolutely no interest in the peaceful resolution of the problem in Somalia with the TFG which has been recognized as a legitimate Government of Somalia by IGAD, AU, UN and the International Community as a whole.

However, what is most worrying is the fact that the CCIC has continued to import all types of sophisticated arms from outside the region, and also has been receiving fighters from areas proximate to our region in great numbers. This is being conducted in broad daylight. These fighters have been involved with the CCIC fighters in their recent operation to control Kismayo. At the present time the CCIC controlled areas, primarily Mogadishu, are awash with money and sophisticated arms coming from outside the region. While this is going on, the TFG is bereft of any support from any source. The CCIC took over Kisamyo without any fight from the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) because the latter was not in a position to receive even a bullet from any source. The massive violation of the arms embargo by the supporters of the CCIC has made the embargo so meaningless that the general effect has been to tie the hands of the legitimate Government and those like the JVA that has been the ally of the TFG. That is precisely why IGAD and AU have been appealing to the international community for the partial lifting of the arms embargo.

Therefore, I appeal to you to take seriously how much the political landscape of Somalia has changed at the present time, and how the situation on the ground has been transformed beyond anything that anybody, including the Monitoring Group, could have imagined only a few month ago. No doubt the Monitoring Group would not also be oblivious to what has been the genesis of this latest development; a development which had created an opportunity for the CCIC to embark on this dangerous exercise,-beginning early this year after having defeated the Mogadishu warlords.

In conclusion, I want to reassure your Excellency, as the Chairman of the Monitoring Group; once again that Ethiopia will continue to cooperate with the Monitoring Group so that it would successfully discharge its heavy responsibilities. But at the same time, Ethiopia appeals to the Monitoring Group not to overlook the context within which the Monitoring Group is called upon to discharge its obligation.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dawit Yohannes, Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations

Annex XI

Government of Iran response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 www.Iran-UN.org Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail:PR-Iran@un.int

Permanent Representative

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

No.550 September 26, 2006

Dear Sir,

With reference to your letter no. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.31, dated August 9, 2006; I have the honor to inform you that, according to the information received from the relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there has been no transfer or shipment of any kind of weapons or military equipments from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia.

I have further the honor to reiterate that according to the same information, no flight has been taken place from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia on July 25, 2006 and therefore, the allegations raised against my country in the aforementioned letter are totally rejected.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

M. Javad Zarif

Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman of Monitoring Group on Somalia
United Nations
New York

Annex XII

Government of Libya response to the Monitoring Group

The Permanent Mission of the
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
to the United Nations
309 East 48th Street
New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 752-5775

بعثة
الجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

No: 8·109·1420

The Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Untied Nations presents its compliments to the Monitoring Group on Somalia established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1671(2006), and has the honour to refer to the latter's note ref # S\AC.29\2006\MG\OC.22 dated 12 June 2006, wherein the Monitoring Group requests information about two Libyan aircrafts that landed in Somalia, in 2004 and 2005.

In this regard, the Mission wishes to inform that the competent authorities in Libya have relayed the following information about the above mentioned flights:

> **The two Libyan aircrafts are air-force planes usually used for air cargo. They made two trips to Somalia one on 20 April 2004, and the other on 14 September 2004. The purpose of both trips was to repatriate illegal aliens who have infiltrated into the country.**

The Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Untied Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Monitoring Group on Somalia established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1671(2006) the assurances of its highest consideration.

8 August 2006

The Monitoring Group on Somalia
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1671(2006)
C\O: The Secretariat of the Security Council Committee
establishes pursuant to resolution 751(1992) on Somalia
Room # S-3055
Fax: (212) 963-1300 or 963-3778

Annex XIII

Government of Saudi Arabia response to the Monitoring Group

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Saudi Arabian Permanent Mission
To the United Nations
New York

البعثة الدائمة للمملكة العربية السعودية
لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

- Unofficial Translation -

Excellency Mr. Bruno Schiemsky,

Referring to your letter (Re: S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.50) dated 25/08/2006 in which you mention the information received by the Monitoring Group on Somalia on the plane that departed from Jazan and your request for further information.

Our delegation received the information from the specialized authorities in the Kingdom that the above mentioned plane is a medical one and it was secured and processed on 10/6/2006 in order to transfer the former Somali President Adam Abdullah Othman from Riyadh to Somalia upon the request of the Somali Embassy in Riyadh. Coordination with official authorities has been done in order to get the necessary permits to cross and land at the airport in Somalia (Baledogle). The plane has landed in the airport of king Abdullah in Jazan in order to refuel and then it departed to continue its mission.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration and respect.

Permanent Representative
Ambassador Fawzi Bin Abdul Majeed Shobokshi

H.E. Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council Resolution 1676 (2006)

Annex XIV

Islamic Courts Union response to the Monitoring Group

GOLAHA
MAXKAMADAHA
ISLAAMIGA
SOMALIYEED

مجلس المحاكم
الإسلامية
في الصومال

Date: ___/___/___ تاريخ: ___/___/___

Ref: XG/GMIS/0034/2006 رقم: _____

October 2, 2006

His Excellency Bruno Schiemsky, Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council Resolution 1676 (2006)
New York, USA, Fax: 001212 9631300/212 963 3778

Excellency:

This is to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of September 20, 2006 regarding Security Council Resolution 733 (1992).

On behalf of the Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC), we would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to reply to the false information against the SICC about the alleged violations of the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia. These allegations are baseless and we categorically deny any violations of the arms embargo of the UN.

We feel that this misinformation is a desperate attempt to cover-up Ethiopia's constant violations of the UN arms embargo on Somalia. Even though there might be other countries or companies involved, certainly, Ethiopia is the main country that has been breaking the UN arms embargo on Somalia on regular basis. It is obvious that Ethiopia has been openly supplying enormous quantities of sophisticated arms to the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa and the entire world is watching!

Additionally, Ethiopia has been violating the independence and the territorial integrity of Somalia by illegally occupying several Somali towns and violating the basic human rights of the population.

To mask its invasion and aggression on Somalia, Ethiopia has been pushing the so call AU/IGAD Deployment Force or AU/IGAD "Peace" keeping Force! We do not see these forces as peace keeping. They are destabilizing or invading foreign forces, therefore, we kindly request the UN and the international community to abort this dangerous mission.

Your Excellency, as you know, IGAD is deeply split on this illegal deployment mission. Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan have clearly indicated their opposition to this Ethiopian agenda, while Kenya and Uganda are assisting Ethiopia.

Finally, our request to the UN is to maintain its impartial position and continue the arms embargo on Somalia.

Shaikh Sharif Shaikh Ahmed
Chairman, Executive Council
Somali Islamic Courts Council
Mogadishu, Somalia

Tel:00252-1-226191/642951/002525-9-39841.Fax:00252-1-642960 E-mail:Islamic_courts@yahoo.com

Annex XV:

Government of Syria response to the Monitoring Group

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N. Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 661-1313

SC/GEN -598

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, established by Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), and with reference to its note no. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.63 dated 22 September 2006, has the honour to inform the esteemed Chairman, upon instructions from my Government, that the alleged information contained in the abovementioned document is totally false and is not based on any evidence. Syria fought and still fights terrorism as well as terrorists groups either in Syria or elsewhere in the world. Syria has cooperated with the international community in fighting terrorism in accordance with the Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and Syria reports regularly to the relevant committees of the Security Council in this regard.

The ulterior motive sources that reported the false information on the existence of cooperation between Syria and the ICU are using such allegations as a tool to increase pressure on Syria.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group on Somalia the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 9 October 2006

Office of the Chairman
Of the Monitoring Group
On Somalia
United Nations
NEW YORK

Annex XVI:

Government of Yemen response to the Monitoring Group

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Office of the President of the Republic 30 September 2006

Our country's reply to the questions of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group on Somalia

I. Allegations that our country sent arms shipments to Somalia

1. The Government of the Republic of Yemen affirms that it provided no weapons or military assistance to the Somali Government, to Puntland state or to any of the Somali parties during the period referred to in the letter of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and that the information in that connection contained in the said letter is incorrect.

2. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to send a list of aircraft flights for the period referred to in the letter of the Monitoring Group, bearing in mind that most of the flights from our country to Bossaso are transit flights.

3. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group on Somalia in the same spirit and with the same transparency that it has always sought to display in the past.

4. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ever determined to implement the embargo resolution on the basis of its responsibility towards the international community, the essentials for stability and security in Somalia and the Somalis' need for dialogue and reconciliation above all.

5. The Government of the Republic of Yemen stresses the importance of striving to ensure the accuracy, clarity and transparency of the information used and the sources dealt with by the Monitoring Group, as well as the importance of primarily establishing the authenticity of both so that no expediency is lost.

6. The Monitoring Group should take into account the developments in the current politics of Somalia following the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union, in addition to the consequences for the embargo resolution, the mechanisms for its implementation and the worth of its contribution to normalizing the situation and ensuring the success of the reconciliation and dialogue, in view of the multitude of arms sources and the intensification of conflict that is open to all possibilities.

II. Allegations of arms smuggling from our country to Somalia via arms traders

1. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is making enormous efforts to combat arms-smuggling operations to Somalia and is working hard to finish equipping the coastguard forces recently established to secure its long coastal strip, a project for which additional support is required from the international community.

2. The Government of the Republic of Yemen welcomes any information from the Group on any arms smuggling from its territory to Somalia and affirms that it cracks down strongly on boats confirmed to be engaged in arms smuggling by referring their owners and men to the courts, as was recently done in the case of several such boats. In this regard, it points out the possibility that non-Yemeni entities are using Yemeni boats to transport arms from other countries to Somalia.

3. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to follow up and investigate cases relating to arms smuggling to Somalia, in which connection it has taken a number of measures aimed at the following:

- Closing arms markets in the context of official efforts for the return and purchase of arms;

- Strengthening control, inspection and monitoring procedures for Yemeni ports, airports and coastal areas in order to enforce the embargo resolution;

- Numbering and listing boats in all ports, particularly fishing boats;

- Strengthening the role of the new coastguard administration, establishing a radio network and monitoring centres on the coasts and readying a specialist force and armed patrol boats in accordance with available resources.

Annex XVII

Arms purchases and sales at the BAM investigated during the mandate period

Identity of individual conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	**Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction**	**Role (Supplier/purchaser/ seller)**
Qanyare Afrah Mohamed Businessman and former Minister for National Security in the TFG	80 AK-47, 20 PKM, 20 RPG-7, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition **05.2006** 45 AK-47, 24 PKM, 16 RPG-2 and RPG-7, 2 DShK **10-20.08.2006**	Purchased the arms Bought through business people who are not suspected by the Sharia Courts in Mogadishu
Rage Shiraar Bashir Businessman	150 AK-47, 22 PKM, 2 ZU-23 and a variety of ammunition **05.2006**	Purchased the arms
Muse Sudi Yalahow Former Minister of Commerce in the TFG	145 AK-47, 33 PKM, 12 mortars, 3 DShK, 2 B-10 and a variety of ammunition **05.2006**	Purchased the arms
Habsade Mohamed Ibrahim MP Minister of the TFG	A variety of ammunition **11.07.2006** 110 AK-47, 28 PKM, 3 B-10, 20 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition **20.08 to 20.09.2006**	Purchased the arms and brought them to Baidoa Purchased the arms
Barre Aden Shire "Hirale" Minister of Defense in the TFG Formerly charge of Kismaayo	2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **11.07.2006** 150 AK-47, 40 PKM, 50 RPG-2/7, mines **20.08 to 20.09.2006**	Purchased the arms and brought them to Kismaayo Purchased the arms
Abukar Omar Adaan Businessman	A variety of ammunition worth 500.000 USD	Purchased the arms

Financier AIAI	**05.2006**	
BAM traders	1 ZP-39, 12 mortars, 6 DShK and a variety of ammunition **29.04.2006**	From Somaliland via Puntland by road to the BAM
	360 AK-47, ammunition for ZU-23, B-10, RPG-2, RPG-7, DShK and ZP-39 **07.05.2006**	From Puntland via Galkayo and Beletweyne to the BAM
	Many AK-47, 63 PKM, 12 DShK, 4 ZU-23, 8 Dhuunshilke and ammunition **15.05.2006**	Brought by traders to the BAM
	480 AK-47, 24 PKM, 26 RPG-7, 24 mortars and a variety of ammunition **27.05.2006**	Shipped from Yemen by trading networks to the BAM
	300 AK-47, 120 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **12.06.2006**	Brought by traders to the BAM on behalf of the Sharia Courts
	250 pistols and ammunition **20.06.2006**	Brought by traders to the BAM
	An unknown quantity of AK-47, RPG-2 and ammunition **23.06.2006**	Brought by traders to the BAM
	Small arms, some anti aircraft guns and a variety of ammunition **19.07.2006**	Brought by traders to the BAM via the port of El Adde
	680 AK-47, 132 PKM, 12 B-10, 15 DShK, 25 82mm and 120mm mortars, landmines, anti tank mines,	Brought by traders to the BAM

	large quantity of ammunition for AK-47, ZP-39, DShK, PKM and RPG **20.08 to 20.09.2006**	
Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siyad "Indohaadde" Warlord/businessman, governor of Lower Shabelle and associated with Al Ittihaad Al-Islaami	100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a variety of ammunition **05.2006** 97 AK-47 **03.08.2006**	Purchased the arms and gave them to Yusuf Mire Seerar, deputy of Barre Aden Shire "Hirale" Purchased the arms and brought them to Marka
Sharia Courts	235 AK-47, 45 PKM, 37 RPG-7, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition **05.2006** 185 AK-47, 70 RPG-2 and RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **16.06.2006** 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **22.06.2006** 50 AK-47, 6 PKM, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **20.06.2006** 25 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition **05.07.2006** 38 AK-47, 1 DShK and a variety of ammunition **08.07.2006** 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **11.07.2006**	Purchased the arms Purchased the arms Purchased the arms Sharia Court at Guriel purchased the arms Sharia Court Saruur purchased the arms Sharia Court Jiiramiskiin (Hawaale Clan) purchased the arms Sharia Court at Balad purchased the arms

	40 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition **22.07.2006** 1 ZU-23-1 and ammunition **24.07.2006** An unknown quantity of mines **28.07.2006** **1 ZU-23** **09.08.2006**	Sharia Court Daynille purchased the arms Sharia Court Buuloburto purchased the arms Purchased the arms Purchased the arms
Botan Ise Alin "Haaraan Kunaar" Former Minister for Rehabilitation and Training of Militias in the TFG	120 AK-47, 5 PKM and a variety of ammunition **05.2006**	Purchased the arms
Col. Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdiid Former police Chief Banadir region. He controlled checkpoints between Afgooye and Mogadishu. Was arrested/released in Sweden. Re-arming his militia near Galkayo	200 AK-47, 15 PKM, 9 mortars and a variety of ammunition **05.2006** 16 PKM, 14 RPG-7, 1 B10 and a variety of ammunition **22.06.2006** 7 RPG-7, 6 mortars and a variety of ammunition **25.06.2006** A variety of ammunition **23.06.2006** A variety of ammunition **03.07.2006** 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **23.07.2006** 2 DShK	Purchased the arms Purchased the arms Purchased the arms Purchased the arms Purchased the arms Purchased the arms Purchased the arms through

	31.07.2006 50 AK-47, 16 PKM, 10 RPG-7 **03.08.2006** 75 AK-47 **10-20.08.2006** 170 AK-47, 25 PKM, 9 82mm or 120mm mortars, 28 RPG-2/7, mines and ammunition **20.08 to 20.09.2006**	his clan representative. Will mount them on 4x4 vehicles he received from Ethiopia Purchased the arms and wants to bring them to his base at the Somali/Ethiopian border Bought through business people who are not suspected by the Sharia Courts in Mogadishu Purchased the arms
Abdirashid Ilqeyte Businessman, owner of the Sahafi Hotel now under the control of the ICU	95 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition **05.2006**	Purchased the arms
Abdi Nuur Siyad "Waal" Freelance militia leader	45 AK-47, 9 PKM, 3 mortars and a variety of ammunition **05.2006** 5 PKM, 3 DShK and a variety of ammunition **10-20.08.2006**	Purchased the arms Bought through business people who are not suspected by the Sharia Courts in Mogadishu
Galjeel clan	30 AK-47, 6 PKM and a variety of ammunition **03.07.2006**	Purchased the arms
Yusuf Mire Seeraar Militia Commander in Kismaayo	100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a variety of ammunition **05.2006**	Received from Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siyad "Indohaadde" who bought the arms at the BAM
Yusuf Dabageed	5 PKM and 1 DShK	Purchased the arms

Former governor of Hiraan region	**09.08.2006**	
Mohamed Omar Habeeb "Dheere" Former Governor Middle Shabelle	4 DShK and ammunition **23.07.2006** 10 PKM **31.07.2006** 65 AK-47, 2 B-10 **10-20.08.2006** 90 AK-47, 27 PKM, 4 B-10, 6 DShK, 40 RPG-2/7, mines and a variety of ammunition **20.08 to 20.09.2006**	Purchased the arms Purchased the arms and brought them to his base in Quria Joome??? Bought through business people who are not suspected by the ICU in Mogadishu Purchased the arms
Abdishukri	130 AK-47, 6 PKM, 3 120mm mortars, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **05.2006**	Purchased the arms
Hussein Mohamed Aideed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior TFG	48 AK-47 and ammunition **19.06.2006**	Purchased the arms
Goobaanle Militia Commander in Kismaayo	175 AK-47, 26 PKM, 7 120mm mortars, 3 DShK and a variety of ammunition **20.08 to 20.09.2006**	Purchased the arms

Comment:
Dhuunshilke = 1 barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tri-pod
Sekawe (also know as S.K.U) = 1 barrel Zu-23 with seat for the gunner

Annex XVIII

Air Tomisko response to the Monitoring Group

Sharjah Airport Authority
CARGO MANIFEST
ICAO ANNEX 9 APPENDIX 2

Date : 01-08-2006
Time : 19:15
Page : 1

Owner/Operator : AIR TOMOSKO
Aircraft Regn : YUAMJ Flight No :TOH-607 Date : 02-08-2006
Point of Loading : SHARJAH Point of Unloading : As Shown

Airway Bill Number	No of Pcs	Nature of goods	Spc Cgo	Wt	Org Des	Fin Des	For other us
**** DESTINATION : MGQ - MOGADISHU ****							
ULD Cargo : NIL							
** Cargo Type : Bulk Cargo							
BBTC-00019493	1/1	SMART CARDS		52.000	SHJ	MGQ	SLI238173
BBTC-00019495	32/32	SWITCH EQUIPMENTS		5310.000	SHJ	MGQ	SLI237174
BBTC-00019496	20/20	LANTREN GLAS CHIM		167.000	SHJ	MGQ	SLI238176
BBTC-00019497	3/3	MANS SHOES		120.000	SHJ	MGQ	SLI238175
BBTC-00019498	5/5	ANTENNA PARTS		304.000	SHJ	MGQ	SLI238177
BBTC-00019499	25/25	HERBAL MEHNDI		775.000	SHJ	MGQ	SLI238178
BBTC-00019500	1527/1527	GARMENTS & SHOES		38550.000	SHJ	MGQ	SLI238179
	1613			45278.000			
Mail : NIL							
DESTN TOTAL :	1613			45278.000			

Notes : TTL CARGO WT. 45325.000KGS.(TTL 03 LBD'S)

Prepared By : E1733 19:15:50 LT Total pages : 1

We Received 45278 kg Without any problem

2/8/06

Annex XIX

Government of Oman response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of Oman
To The United Nations
866 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
(212) 355 3505

5221/25220/2211/671

25 September 2006

Excellency,

While acknowledging the receipt of your letters nos. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.38 and S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.37 dated 18 August 2006 concerning the Monitoring Group's investigation on the possible violations of the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia, imposed by Security Council resolution 733 (1992), I have the honour to inform that all three aircrafts, A/C type: IL-76, AN24 and YK-18, mentioned on your letters which landed in Somalia on flights from Salalah, Oman, repatriated Somalis apprehended while illegally entering Oman.

Please accept the assurances of my esteemed regards,

Yours sincerely,

F. Alhinai

FUAD AL-HINAI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

H.E. Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1676 (2006)

Annex XX:

Finance: Revenues from small businesses and checkpoints

Jowhar: Revenues from small businesses

Description	Quantity	Unit Fee	Daily	Monthly	Yearly
		United States Dollars			
Shops	4000	0.3	1200	36000	432000
Stores and ware houses	110	1.3	143	4290	51480
Remittance branches	23	0.83	19	570	6840
Kiosks	1300	0.2	260	7800	93600
Restaurants	38	1	38	1140	13680
Street vendors	1150	0.1	115	3450	41400
Telecommunication branches	45	0.33	14.85	445.5	5346
Milk and grass vendors	240	0.13	31.2	936	11232
Total			1821.05	54631.5	655578

Non-official data

Jowhar: Revenues from checkpoints

Description	Quantity	Unit Fee	Daily	Monthly	Yearly
		United States Dollars			
Mini bus (Mogadishu - Jowhar)	16	4	64	1920	23040
Mini bus to other regions)	35	6	210	6300	75600
Trucks	20	60	1200	36000	432000
Smaller trucks	30	35	1050	31500	378000
Vehicles transiting to Jowhar, Mogadishu and Balad	16	6	96	2880	34560
Vegetable vendors	31	15	465	13950	167400
Charcoal	8	60	480	14400	172800
Grass	6	20	120	3600	43200
Total			3685	110550	1326600

Non-official data

Annex XXI

Finance: Letter with regard to Mogadishu Seaport fees

Fees at Mogadishu Seaport

Somali Islamic Courts Council

Date 29/07/06

Ref_____

Thank for Allah today, the date is 29/July/2006 which (corresponding to) 7/Rajan/1427 of (SMC), Islamic courts Council and Banadir region businessmen had managed to met and agreed taxation for Mogadishu main port which will be as follows;

S/No	Commodity Type	Taxation ($)	Laborers ($)	Transportation ($)
01	A bag of ration (50kg)	0.90	0.14	0.24
02	A bag fertilizer (50Kg)	0.50	0.1832	0.24
03	A bag of Cement (50 Kg)	0.60	0.1559	0.24
04	A bag L/D (50 KG)	0.60	0.14	0.24
05	A ton of fuel	12.00	Nil	
06	Big Bundle	6	1.299	
07	Big Bundle	4.55	0.9746	
08	Big Carton	0.80	0.1213	
09	Small Cartons	0.50	0.10	
10	Small tiers/wheels	0.60	0.10	
11	Big tiers/wheels	1.00	0.1444	
12	Mattresses	0.75	0.1188	
13	Timber (Cubic Meter)	15		
14	Iron/steel	18		

15	Full drum	4	1.1545	
16	Trailer	12,00	43.326	
17	Truck trailer-N-3 Etc	900	43.326	
18	Ten ton truck Etc	800	43.326	
19	Vehicle (Landcruser) Etc	360	21.663	
20	Luxury cars Etc	270	21.663	
21	Big Generator	200	1.299	
22	Small Generator	100	1.299	

With regard to the vehicle taxations it has only been mentioned above those are known in terms of their weight and capacity. However, those are not unknown the taxation will be based on their volume and weight.

On the side of Somalia Islamic Courts Council signed by

1. Abdulkadir Abukar Omar - Head of Finance –SICC
2. Mohamed Kahiye Siyad – Head of general transportation

On the side of Banadir region Business-men signed by

1. Mohamud Abdikarim Ali – Chairman of Banadir Businessman
2. Ismail Cabdilahi Siyad (Gooni)
3. Omar Mohamud Hubane (Carabey)

Annex XXII:

Finance: Fees at Mogadishu International Airport

PREVIOUS TARIFF

#	PARTICULARS	QUANTITY	PRICE
1	Departing passengers	Per person	$20
2	Arriving passengers	Per person	-
3	Departing cargo	Per Kg	$0.010
4	Departing cargo-SEA FOOD	Per Kg	$0.015
5	Arriving cargo	Per Kg	-
6	Loaders charge for arriving cargo	Per Kg	$0.071
7	Security charge	Per flight	$1100
8	Landing fees	Per flight	$350

CURRENT TARIFF

#	PARTICULAR	QUANTITY	PRICE
1	Departing passengers	Per person	$20
2	Arriving passengers	Per person	$20
3	Departing cargo	Per Kg	$0.015
4	Departing cargo-SEA FOOD	Per person	$0.020
5	Arriving cargo	Per Kg	$0.135
6	Loaders charge for arriving cargo	Per Kg	$0.007
7	Security charges	Per flight	$1100
8	Landing fees	Per flight	$500-700

Estimated revenues at Mogadishu International Airport

Description	Quantity	Unit fee	Daily	Monthly	Yearly
		United States Dollars			
Flight charges (Security and landing fees)	4	1700	6800	204000	2448000
Passengers departing and arriving)	120	20	2400	72000	864000
Cargo (Imp. & Expo.)	60 tons	152.5	9150	274500	3294000
Total			18350	550500	6606000

Non-official data

Annex XXIII

Letter from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission

AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION
Chairperson

BC/FK/D/725.06 **Addis Ababa, 30 July 2006**

Dear Mr. Schiemsky,

I wish to refer to your letter of 7 July 2006 in which you have requested a meeting with the Africa Union Commission, engaging our interest for a closer working relationship with the United Nations. The Commission commends the work of the monitoring group and is cognisant of the systematic excellent reports produced on the Somalia arms embargo and its recommendations towards a peaceful resolution of the Somali crisis.

We at the African Union, have continually condemned the flagrant violations of the UN arms embargo on Somalia and denounces any act or omission by state and non-state actors which undermines the much needed security in Somalia, and which lends to the increasing instability in the country. In this regard, the Commission welcomes closer cooperation with the United Nations as informed in the statement issued at the 7th African Union Summit in Banjul, the Gambia; the paramount aim of such collaborative effort is the creation of a secure environment in which concerted efforts are made towards democratic strategies for the consolidation of democracy, the prevention of conflict and the building of a sustainable peace in Somalia. Consequently, the Commission will be pleased to meet with the Monitoring Group at the UN head quarters first week in August 2006.

Please accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Alpha Oumar Konare

Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council Resolution 1676 (2006)
United Nations, New York
Fax : + 1 212 963 13 00/ 963 37 78

Annex XXIV

Countries visited and representatives of Governments, organizations and private entities interviewed

Kenya

Government officials

Kenya Ministry of Defence (Navy)
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence (Navy)
Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
H. E. Muhammed A. Affey, Kenya Ambassador to Somalia
Kenya Maritime Authority
Kenya Ports Authority
Kenya National Focal Point on illicit Small Arms and light Weapons

State representatives

Ambassador of Finland
Liaison Office of the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic

International organizations

European Union, delegation of the European Commission
Somali Donor Group
Food Security Assessment Unit
ICAO
IMO
Special Representative of the Secretary-General François Lounseny Fall (United Nations Political Office for Somalia)
UNDP Somalia
United Nations Department of Safety and Security
WFP Somalia

Madagascar

East Africa and West Indian Ocean Maritime Security Conference

United States of America

State representatives

Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations

International organizations

Yemen

Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs