Don’t Bomb Iran

Forbes magazine, the conservative magazine of the biggest Big Business, ran the following article  on May 5 2006, just one of numerous experts who say that President Ahmedinejad has little influence on foreign policy or on military command, saying “His. notorious statement in October that Israel should be “wiped off the map” was immediately downplayed by other regime figures. His rhetoric was mainly aimed at galvanizing his own support among radical conservatives by highlighting his commitment to the ideals of the revolution. It has certainly not translated into any change in Iranian policy.
Iran President Has Little Impact on Foreign Policy
Oxford Analytica 05.04.06, 6:00 AM ET

President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad on April 28 said that Tehran would pay no attention to U.N. resolutions requiring it to halt its nuclear work. His impact on Iranian foreign policy has been rhetorical rather than substantive. The regime is more pragmatic than his rhetoric would indicate. Tehran is seeking to exploit its unprecedented position of strength to bring Washington to the bargaining table.

Ahmadi-Nejad represents a younger generation of conservatives whose definitive political experience was the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. They are represented in the 7th Majlis by the powerful Abadgaran (Developers) bloc. They reject Iran’s turn toward pragmatism after the war and yearn for a return to the radical policy of “exporting the revolution,” seeing opportunities to do so today in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.

The role of the presidency in foreign policy, under the Rafsanjani (1989-97) and Khatami (1997-2005) administrations, was to act as the public face of the regime to the international community and to implement its policies, as formulated by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), with the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Ahmadi-Nejad has leveraged these powers in an attempt to steer policy in the direction of radicalism. However, beyond appointments and rhetoric, Ahmadi-Nejad has had little impact on foreign policy. This is evident in the key policy areas:

1. U.S. Relations: Iran continues to seek direct negotiations with Washington in the hope of reaching an accommodation with it. Tehran has agreed to direct talks on Iraq and has indicated that it wishes to expand the agenda beyond Iraq. Iran’s policy remains to engage Washington on issues of mutual interest in the hope of convincing it to abandon its policy of regime change. Nuclear policy is partly geared toward the same objective, providing added leverage.

2. Nuclear Technology: Iran is committed to the development of the full nuclear fuel cycle, but the insistence on domestic production of nuclear fuel is not an innovation of Ahmadi-Nejad. Furthermore, despite his tough rhetoric, Iranian negotiators have indicated that Tehran would be willing to reach a compromise on the issue of fuel production.

The purpose of the nuclear program is to establish Iran as a major regional power. Nuclear technology gives it the capabilities and prestige to balance U.S. and Israeli power in the region. This, in Tehran’s view, would compel Washington to abandon policies of containment and regime change in Iran in favor of engagement.

3. Iraq: Tehran continues to expand its influence within Iraq, particularly among the Shia political parties, while using this influence to dampen sectarian violence. It also continues to support the political process in Baghdad because it feels that a democratic system will be to the advantage of its Shia allies.

4. Israel/Palestine: Ahmadi-Nejad’s notorious statement in October that Israel should be “wiped off the map” was immediately downplayed by other regime figures. His rhetoric was mainly aimed at galvanizing his own support among radical conservatives by highlighting his commitment to the ideals of the revolution. It has certainly not translated into any change in Iranian policy.

5. Afghanistan: Iran under Ahmadi-Nejad continues to maintain friendly relations with the Karzai government. Tehran has various strong interests in a stable and prosperous Afghanistan.

Ahmadi-Nejad’s influence over foreign policy has also been constrained by the limits imposed on him by Khamenei:

– Rafsanjani: One of Ahmadi-Nejad’s chief critics, Rafsanjani now chairs the powerful Expediency Council (EC). A long-time pragmatist, Rafsanjani acts as a powerful moderating force on Iranian policy.

– SNSC: The power of the president and his ministers has also been diminished by the centrality of the SNSC in decision making, rather than the cabinet. In the SNSC, Ahmadi-Nejad and his ministers have been largely sidelined by more pragmatic figures. In this way, Khamenei has retained direct control over the most sensitive policy decisions.

While Iranian behavior post-Khatami has shown a greater propensity for confrontation, this is a function of Tehran’s unprecedented position of strength, rather than the influence of Ahmadi-Nejad.

Ahmadi-Nejad has had little substantive impact on Iranian policy to date. However, this could change. If Iran miscalculates and finds itself the subject of sanctions or military attack, the political climate in Tehran will be dramatically radicalized, silencing the pragmatists. Iran will be forced to retaliate and Ahmadi-Nejad’s tough talk may start to translate into policy.

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