Don’t Bomb Iran

summary: a Jerusalem Post article about a US Army War College report
that has just been published. It suggests that Israels air force cannot
take out Iranian nuclear facilities. The report also assserts that “Iran is
now no more than 12 to 48 months from acquiring a nuclear bomb” and
is generally full of the “could” arguments that US analysts are so fond
of.

The full 320 page report , “Getting ready for a Nuclear Ready Iran” is
at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB629.pdf

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1132475697997&
pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

US Army: no option for Israel against Iranian nukes
Arieh O’Sullivan, THE JERUSALEM POST Dec. 7, 2005

There is a popular belief that Israel would do anything to prevent
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The deliberate slew of
ambiguous statements by Israeli leaders and military commanders
concerning a possible Israeli attack on Iran is for the most part fuel to
help the Europeans and US pressure Teheran to quit their nuclear
ambitions.

Now, a report by the US Army War College concludes that the Air
Force could probably hit targets in Iran, but not maintain a sustained air
campaign that would deliver a deathblow to their nuclear weapons
program.

“The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has formidable capabilities and enjoys
unchallenged supremacy vis- -vis the other Middle East air powers,”
the report said. “But Israel has no aircraft carriers and it cannot use
airbases in other Middle East states; therefore its operational
capabilities are reduced when the targets are located far from its
territory.”

The 320-page report was entitled “Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready
Iran” and put out by the Strategic Studies Institute of the influential US
Army War College.

The chapter on Israel was drafted by Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom, a
former head of strategic planning for the IDF and now a senior
research associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

The report did not mention other possible strike platforms such as
Eritrea in Africa.

Brom said Israel’s intelligence and military community was divided
over the Iranian threat. He said IDF military intelligence and some MKs
regarded Iran as a bitter ideological enemy determined to annihilate
Israel. The other school is represented by the Mossad and National
Security Council, Ministry of Defense and Foreign Ministry, who see
Teheran as preoccupied with national defense and regime survival.

“While the first school assumes no political pressure can force Iran to
stop its military nuclear program, the other school believes that political
pressure can be effective in at least delaying the nuclear program
significantly,” the report said. “The second school believes that a
nuclear Iran with a different regime will not pose a high risk to Israel
and can be easily deterred.”

But should Israel decide to attack, the report argued that to be effective
it would “necessitate sustainable strikes on a relatively large number of
targets that are well-defended.” It said the nuclear power plant at
Bushier was vulnerable to attack but not part of the military nuclear
program. The centrifuge plant built at Natanz is underground, and it is
defended by an extensive ground air defense system.

“It is very difficult to find in the Iranian nuclear program one vulnerable
point that, once it is attacked and destroyed, the Iranian program is
stopped or stalled for a long time,” the report said. Brom noted that a
successful strike on Iran required a sustained air assault on targets
between 1,500 to 1,700 kilometers from Israel. He argued that it was
“highly unlikely” that Turkey and India would let Israel use their
countries as a launching pad.

He mentioned that flying directly would strain relations with Jordan and
over Iraq could pit US interceptors against the IAF. A longer route over
the Indian Ocean presents minimal penetration of air space of other
states.

“This means that the Israeli attack aircraft would have to take off from
air bases in Israel, fly 1,500-1,700 kilometers to the targets, destroy
them, and then fly back 1,500-1,700 kilometers,” the report said.
Refueling would be problematic, since the few 707s are very
vulnerable and shouldn’t operate over hostile air space. At least two
mid-air refuelings were considered necessary for a strike.

Detection and interception by the Iranian air defense were limited and
there was a high probability the IAF aircraft would be successful in
destroying their target by using a mix of tactics, smart munitions and
electronic counter measures, the report said.

According to the report, Israel’s deep-strike air capability was based on
its 25 Boeing F-15I and 137 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D aircraft. The Air
Force has already received more than 20 F-16Is, with longer range on
the F-15I, but the report said the F-15I aircraft contained greater
capabilities at long ranges.

The report said the F-15I had an operational radius of 1,270
kilometers. The F-16I has an operational radius of 2,100 kilometers
while that of the F-16C/D is 925 kilometers.

But the report said the real operational radius was shorter because the
planes would have to fly at low altitude to avoid radar detection. Also
required was a large aerial task force composed of such support
aircraft as air refueling, electronic countermeasures, support,
communication and rescue.

“The conclusion is that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets
and not as part of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one-time
surprise operation,” the report said. “Even if Israel had the attack
capabilities needed for the destruction of all the elements of the Iranian
nuclear program, it is doubtful whether Israel has the kind of
intelligence needed to be certain that all the necessary elements of the
program were traced and destroyed fully.” Nevertheless, he wrote that
a government would not necessarily have much to lose domestically by
a preemptive strike.

“It can be safely assumed that any Israeli action against the Iranian
nuclear program would enjoy vast support by Israeli public opinion.
Even a failure of the operation would not erode the support because of
the almost general consensus of the public.”

The Iranian reaction would also be severely limited. An Iranian air
strike would be almost suicidal, and a Shehab missile strike would also
not be terribly dangerous, considering its inaccuracy and the Israeli air
defenses (such as the Arrow 2). Also, using its proxy Hizbullah in
Lebanon would undoubtedly draw a severe Israeli retaliation against
Syria, which could fall at this weak moment in Bashar Assad’s regime.
Iran does not want this.

This leaves attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad.

Israel’s Arab neighbors of the Middle East would likely condemn the
action, but quietly breath relief and do nothing. The Europeans would
bark, but also do nothing and relations with the United States would not
be harmed.