Don’t Bomb Iran

Iran took out a full page advertisment in the New York Times in November 2005, with a very long, very detailed account of it’s past and future nuclear activities; explaining the hypocricy at the IAEA; why it has done what; their view of their legal rights to do enrichment;, and why it had to seek nuclear technology on the black market in the past. It is an extraordinary, and detailed piece,and can be found at

http://www.antiwar.com/blog/more.php?id=2523_0_1_0_M

of particular interest is their offer in March 2005 of guarantees
beyond anything required by the IAEA’s additional protocol, including
permanent on-site presence of IAEA inspectors… see section 4.2 reprinted below
The EU3 apparently never responded to this offer.

4.2 On March 23, 2005, in a clearly stated desire to salvage the Paris Agreement, Iran offered a collection of solutions for objective guarantees suggested by various independent scientists and observers from the United States and Europe.
The package included:

1. Strong and mutually beneficial relations between Iran and the EU/EU3,which would provide the best guarantee for respect and the concerns of each side;

2. Confinement of Iran’s enrichment program, in order to preclude through objective technical guarantees any proliferation concern:

a. Open fuel cycle, to remove any concern about reprocessing and
production of plutonium;

b. Ceiling of enrichment at LEU level;

c. Limitation of the extent of the enrichment program to solely meet the contingency fuel requirements of Iran’s power reactors;

d. Immediate conversion of all enriched Uranium to fuel rods to preclude even the technical possibility of further enrichment;

e. Incremental and phased approach to implementation in order to begin with the least sensitive aspects of the enrichment program and to gradually move to enrichment as confidence in the program would be enhanced;

3. Legislative and regulatory measures

a. Additional Protocol;

b. Permanent ban on the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons through binding national legislation;

c. Enhancement of Iran’s export control regulations;

4. Enhanced monitoring

a. Continued implementation of the Additional Protocol; and

b. Continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the conversion and enrichment facilities to provide unprecedented added guarantees.