Don’t Bomb Iran

In a 1993 article Bullets Gas and Bombs, is was asserted that Israel asked the US about the effects of dropping 2000 pound bombs on a nuclear reactor, and used US satellite photos to guide pilots on their mission.  The relevant extracts and references are below:

Instead of proposing  [to Iraq] some sort of mutual renunciation of nuclear weapons under the most stringent of international controls, Israel launched a military strike against Osirak in June 1981.

The U.S. supported a Security Council resolution condemning the raid, though making sure that no sanctions were imposed on Israel. Despite the condemnation, there are reasons to believe that Washington was not opposed to the attack. In October 1980, Israel had consulted with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the effect of hypothetically hitting a nuclear power plant with 2000 pound bombs, the kind used in the Osirak strike.<138> Israeli pilots carrying out the raid reportedly used U.S. satellite photos to guide them to their targets.<139> The U.S. began a study of whether Israel’s use of U.S.-supplied aircraft in the raid violated U.S. law, which would require an arms cutoff. The study was never completed.<140>

Even analysts sympathetic to Israel’s view that Iraq was up to no good concluded that the Israeli attack may have stimulated, rather than thwarted, the Arab quest for nuclear weapons.<141> The Israeli position, on the other hand, seemed to be that it would maintain its nuclear monopoly by continuing to destroy any Arab nuclear facilities. Prime Minister Menachem Begin in fact declared that Israel would not tolerate any enemy, Arab or not, acquiring a nuclear capability, thus including Pakistan, and there were reports of an Israeli overture to India, proposing a joint strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.<142>

Shortly after the raid on Iraq, a State Department spokesperson was asked whether the U.S. concern over non- proliferation applied to Israel. The reply consisted of the usual evasions: “the U.S. has no nuclear cooperation with Israel. Our own policy is clear: The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is an important worldwide objective of the United States. We have noted that the Government of Israel has consistently affirmed that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Beyond that I cannot go.”<143>

A week later, Reagan was asked the same question: “Well, I haven’t given very much thought to that particular question there…. It is difficult for me to envision Israel as being a threat to its neighbors. It is a nation that from the very beginning has lived under the threat from neighbors that they did not recognize its right to exist as a nation. I’ll have to think about that question you asked.”<144>

BAD GUYS VS. BAD GUYS

Despite Reagan’s unique quickness of wit, his argument is actually quite commonly heard: Israel’s nuclear weapons program is different from Iraq’s because the former is a peace-loving, humane state while the latter is aggressive and ruthless.

In one respect there _is_ an important difference between Israel and Iraq: only Iraq has used large-scale chemical warfare (though one should note that during the first year alone of the _Intifada_ 66 Palestinians died from exposure to tear gas fired by Israeli troops<145>). But the parallels are much more striking than the differences.

Both nations have sought to develop nuclear arsenals illegally. In 1990 Iraq was “stung” trying to buy U.S. krytrons (needed for nuclear weapons), but five years earlier Israel was also caught trying to illegally obtain U.S. krytrons.<146>

Both nations have been expansionist powers, invading weaker neighbors. If Israel, the strongest conventional power in the region, claims to need the bomb for deterrence, then how much more compelling is a similar claim from Iraq which, after all, has been attacked by Israel. Nor was the Israeli threat to Iraq just a thing of the past. In 1988 Tel Aviv launched a new military satellite which, the _Washington Post_ noted, was widely regarded as a symbol of the Israeli commitment to an offensive, possibly even preemptive strategy. Martin Indyk, the Executive Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, reported after extensive talks with top Israeli military officers that the Israeli Air Force wanted to preempt missiles in Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and that the Air Force view had been accepted.<147>

What makes missiles so dangerous in the region is that they are potential means of delivering nuclear or chemical warheads. Israel, however, has always had the regional lead in this regard. First Israel got the Lance missile from the U.S. and then developed the Jericho missile. Both are too expensive and inaccurate for other than nuclear missions, so it is probable that they have been nuclear-armed.<148> Subsequently Israel developed — without protest from either the Carter or Reagan administrations — the Jericho II, capable of carrying fusion weapons 400 miles.<149> Israel shared missile technology with the Shah’s Iran, South Africa, and Taiwan.<150>

Another means of delivering nuclear warheads is via wide- gauge cannon. Iraq was known to have been actively seeking to develop such a “supergun” with the help of Gerald Bull, a weapons expert recently assassinated, probably by the Mossad.<151> In 1975, South Africa obtained the technology for an earlier nuclear-capable cannon from Bull’s Canadian/U.S. firm with the help of CIA and Israeli agents eager to facilitate Pretoria’s intervention in Angola.<152>

139. Neuman, “Arms, Aid and the Superpowers,” p. 1051; Raviv and Melman,_ Every Spy A Prince_, p. 310.

140. Power, “Preventing Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East,” p. 623.

141. Power, “Preventing Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East,” p. 624.

142. Spector, _Nuclear Proliferation Today_, p. 138; Power, “Preventing Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East,” p. 624; Hunter, _Israeli Foreign Policy_, pp. 33-34, citing David Horovitz, _Jerusalem Post_ Foreign Service, in _Northern California Jewish Bulletin_, 27 Feb. 1987; my colleague Maya Chadda has spoken to Indian officials who confirm the reports.

143. June 8, 1981, U.S. Dept. of State, _American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981_, Washington, DC: 1984, pp. 684- 85.

144. June 16, 1981, Dept. of State, _American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981_, p. 686.

145. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds., _Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation_, Boston: South End Press, 1989, pp. 324-25. See also Louis Wolf, “Israel wages chemical warfare with American tear gas,” _Covert Action Information Bulletin_, no. 30, summer 1988, p. 26.

146. _Newsweek_, 9 April 1990, p. 28. In 1985 Richard Smyth was charged by a federal grand jury in May 1985 with smuggling 810 krytrons to Israel. Smyth disappeared and Israel returned all “unused” krytrons. Raviv and Melman, _Every Spy A Prince_, pp. 304-05.

147. David B. Ottaway, “Middle East Weapons Proliferate,” _Washington Post_, 19 Dec. 1988, p. A4.

148. Peter Pry, _Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal_, Boulder: Westview, 1984, p. 92.

149. Leonard S. Spector, _Going Nuclear_, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987, 140-141.

150. Elaine Sciolino, “Documents detail Israeli missile deal with the Shah,” _NYT_, 1 April 1986, p. A17; Karem, _Nuclear- Weapon Free Zone_, p. 71; Raviv and Melman, _Every Spy A Prince_, p. 345; Pry, _Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal_, p. 37.

151. Kevin Toolis, “The Man Behind Iraq’s Supergun,” _New York Times Magazine_, 26 Aug. 1990, p. 46.

152. Moore, _South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation_, p. 125; Hunter, _Israeli Foreign Policy_, pp. 39-40. See also Toolis, “The Man Behind Iraq’s Supergun,” p. 50.